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The theft of copper cable and working tools at Medupi Power Station is a serious 
concern. The aim of this study was to explore the occurrence of security threats and 
vulnerabilities at Medupi Power Stations as a National Key Point. An explorative 
qualitative research was used. Eighteen participants were selected purposefully. The 
data were collected using in-depth, semi-structured interviews conducted by 
telephone and tape recorder. Data were analysed using thematic data analysis. It 
was revealed that the common modus operandi used by thieves includes the 
smuggling of stolen goods, including copper. Among the causes of security threats 
and vulnerabilities are a lack of manpower to perform essential security functions. It 
is recommended that the theft of copper cable and working tools be prevented and 
various suggestions are provided. Future research should focus on addressing top 
management and management responsible for security to play a role in security 
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INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION FOR RESEARCH 
1.1 Introduction 
Power utilities produce energy and are regarded as essential infrastructure and their 
security needs to be evaluated with an intention to reduce vulnerabilities (Sadeghi, 
Jabbari, Alidoosti & Rezaenian, 2017:17). Benoit (2014:11) indicates that energy 
infrastructure provides energy continuously unless it is damaged or incapacitated. 
Most governments use the concept of Critical Infrastructure (CI) when describing 
systems and assets of high value to the community and economy (Robles, Choi, 
Cho, Kim, Park & Lee, 2008:17). Spellman and Bieber (2010:1) indicate that CI is 
any services and systems that are essential to the functioning of a society which, if 
compromised, would have an impact on the whole country. The energy infrastructure 
is critical to the country and therefore needs to be protected against any form of 
attack (Tweneboah-Koduah & Buchanan, 2018:1).  
Amin and Giacomoni (2012:34) argue that the interconnection of infrastructure, such 
as energy, telecommunications, transportation and finance, creates a challenge 
because they need be secured, reliable and efficient in their operation. CI is exposed 
to different forms of threat, such as criminals or even terrorists (Tabansky, 2011:64), 
and it therefore needs to go through a threat and risk analysis process to select the 
best security measure/s to mitigate the risk (Federal Republic of Germany, 2009:9). 
CI, which includes resources such as the energy supply, power grid, water, 
sewerage and gas pipes, communications and transportation, among others 
(Tweneboah-Koduah & Buchanan, 2018:1; Holmgren, 2004:1), is important to the 
well-being of the public, organisations and the business community (Van Niekerk, 
2011:59). Unguarded assets, cables, working equipment and inadequate security 
measures provide opportunities for crimes to be committed (Kimiecik, 1995:89; 
Kashiefa, 2014:1). 
According to the Department of Public Enterprises (SA, 2019b), 
“Eskom generates approximately 95% of the electricity used in South 
Africa and approximately 45% of the electricity used in Africa. Eskom 
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generates, transmits and distributes electricity to industrial, mining, 
commercial, agricultural and residential customers and redistributors. 
Additional power stations and major power lines are being built to meet 
rising electricity demand in South Africa. Eskom will continue to focus on 
improving and strengthening its core business of electricity generation, 
transmission, trading and distribution. Eskom buys electricity from and 
sells electricity to the countries of the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC). The future involvement in African markets outside 
South Africa (that is the SADC countries connected to the South African 
grid and the rest of Africa) is limited to those projects that have a direct 
impact on ensuring security of supply for South Africa.” 
Eskom’s Medupi Power Station, which is in Limpopo Province, is the fourth largest 
dry-cooled, coal-fired electricity generating power plant in South Africa and in the 
world (ESKOM, 2015:1).  When Medupi is fully installed, the contracts for its boilers 
and turbines will be the highest in electricity generation in South Africa. When fully 
operational, each of the six boilers will have an 800-megawatt output supplying 4 
800 megawatts to the national electricity grid daily. Medupi Power Station has a 
planned operational life of 50 years (SA, 2019a; Kusile & Medupi Power Stations, 
2017). For this period, the power station needs properly evaluated and updated 
security measures to pinpoint weaknesses or shortcomings in its security system. 
This study focused specifically on evaluating the threats and vulnerabilities at the 
Medupi Power Station and not on general security issues facing Eskom in the 
country. The study examined the existing security measures implemented at the 
Medupi Power Station (as a National Key Point/Critical Infrastructure), to identify 
current security threats and weaknesses (possible shortcomings) in those security 
measures; and to investigate the gaps in the existing security measures. In addition, 
the study assessed the security measures as implemented at the Medupi site and 
evaluated the protection of the operations for the generation of electricity. The 
researcher uses the term “Critical Infrastructure” (CI) instead of “National Key Point” 
(NKP), since the National Key Points Act 102 of 1980 (SA, 1980) has been repealed 
and replaced by the Critical Infrastructure Protection Bill of 2007 (CIP) (Mbalula, 
2017:48). Since then, the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act No. 8 of 2019 was 
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passed into law on 28 February 2019. 
This chapter discusses the rationale for the study and the research problem. This 
includes the research questions and the aims and objectives of the research 
together with key definitions, theoretical concepts, and an outline of the chapters of 
the dissertation. 
1.2 Background to the study 
The study focused on the evaluation of threats and vulnerabilities of the Medupi 
Power Station in the Limpopo Province, a National Key Point in South Africa. 
Between 2007 and 2016, Medupi Power Station has experienced high crime rates 
that include the theft of cables and on-site equipment (Dzansi, Rambe & Mathe, 
2014). The study was conducted as a result of improper protection of national key 
points (NKPs) and strategic installations in South Africa (Sovacool, Benjamin & 
Rafey, 2011).  
The main purpose of the National Key Points Act 102 of 1980 (SA, 1980) was to 
protect all areas of national strategic importance against sabotage. Furthermore, in 
South Africa, a problem arose in 2015 when breaches at a National Key Point were 
not declared until after the Johannesburg High Court ruled in favour of the 
Right2Know Campaign (Right2know, 2015:np). In its judgment, the court directed the 
SAPS to reveal the list of protected areas within a period of 30 days. In this case, a 
key problem arose in the application of the National Key Points Act 102 of 1980 (SA, 
1980), which dated back to the apartheid government. It was argued that the 
National Key Points Act 102 of 1980 (SA, 1980), which was being used and applied 
by the government for decades after the abolishment of the apartheid system, was 
not in keeping with democratic principles of the new government. 
The current South African government repealed the National Key Points Act 102 of 
1980 (SA, 1980) and replaced it with the Strategic Installation Bill, 2007 and the 
Critical Infrastructure Protection Bill in 2017. The Critical Infrastructure Protection Act 
No. 8 of 2019 was signed into law by the President of the Republic of South Africa 
on 28 November 2019. The purpose of the legislation is to recognise that specific 
infrastructures are essential for public safety, national security and the uninterrupted 
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provision of basic public services.  Therefore, the CIP Act 8 of 2019 requires that 
proper systems should be developed and implemented to safeguard critical 
infrastructure and provides for the identification and declaration of infrastructure as 
critical (SA, 2019c). 
In South Africa, the Energy supplier, Eskom, is part of Critical Energy Infrastructure 
that is obliged to ensure that it continues to function properly even in adverse 
conditions (European Academy, 2011:2). This is an indication that Eskom’s core 
business of providing essential services to South African citizens must be protected 
against any forms of threats and vulnerabilities. This study focused on the security 
threats and vulnerabilities at Medupi Power Station which, as a result of criminal 
activities, can cause disruption to the provision of electricity services to South African 
citizens.  
1.3 Rationale for the study 
The study was undertaken due to the increase in crime rates at the Medupi Power 
Plant which occurred as a result of security risks and vulnerabilities facing the power 
generation utility. Medupi is considered to be one of the major infrastructure build 
projects initiated by the South African government to provide a reliable supply to the 
electricity grid of the country. The rate of crime at Medupi Power Station for the 
period 2013 to 2017 has fluctuated according to statistics provided by the South 
African Police Services. The graph below provides the statistics of thefts that took 





Figure 1: Total number of cases reported at Medupi as General Theft cases 
from 2013-2017 
Source: South African Police Services, 2013–2017. 
From the statistics provided by the South African Police Service (SAPS), there were 
119 cases of theft reported in a five-year period between 2013 and 2017 with a slight 
increase in 2017 from 2016. It is clear from the above graph that Medupi Power 
Station is been a target for criminals who commit crimes on different properties, 
ranging from generator transformer theft, cable theft, malicious damage to property, 
housebreaking, security breaches and theft of vehicles. These crimes have cost 
implications for the power station, which can impair its operations making it 
vulnerable and unable to attain its strategic objectives. 
The rates of crimes, such as industrial sabotage, contribute to the deterioration of a 
power plant (Peters, 2011:13). A report in Fin24 (2015:np) confirmed that Eskom 
suspended operations at Medupi Power Plant in order to safeguard property and 
employees after the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (Numsa) went 
on strike (Fin24, 2015:np). Furthermore, dissatisfied employees can cause acts of 
sabotage to the power station by bringing in things that could damage the plant, such 
as bombs and loose bolts, or by taking out essential parts of the machinery to cause 
turbine failure or other obstacles Fin24 (2015:np). 
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suffer losses as a result of the power failure caused by sabotage at the power 
station. The location of a National Key Point in this case, bordering on residential 
areas, leaves the power plant vulnerable to violence, cable theft, burglaries and 
other crimes which endanger the security of National Key Points (Rantao & Bailey, 
2011).  
The research sought to identify problems by identifying hazards, risks and 
vulnerabilities at the power station to ensure effective and uninterrupted operations. 
The researcher applied assessment methodology to identify risks and vulnerabilities 
and to make recommendations that will assist the power station in reducing the risks 
to a continuous supply of electricity. 
1.4 Problem statement 
The importance of protecting the CI has been long recognised (Van Niekerk & 
Manoj, 2011). However, in South Africa, the government has not shown an interest 
in developing the relevant legislation, although they have relied on the old National 
Key Points Act 102 of 1980 (SA, 1980) to safeguard national key points in the 
country. This was evidenced by delays in repealing the old National Key Points Act 
102 of 1980 (Van Niekerk & Manoj, 2011). The Critical Infrastructure Protection Act 9 
of 2020 which replaced the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act No. 8 of 2019 and 
the old National Key Points Act 102 of 1980 (SA, 1980) makes provision for the 
necessary protection of Critical Infrastructure (CI) due to the fact that they provide 
essential services such as water and electricity which, if interrupted, can affect the 
power plant itself as well as the surrounding community and businesses. 
Crimes, such as the theft of property, at Medupi Power Station eventually affect the 
economic growth of South Africa as they disrupt normal supplies and hinder job 
creation. Cable theft is not only a South African occurrence and has become a 
scourge worldwide. For example, countries such as the UK, USA, China, India, 
Russia, Kenya and Nigeria have experienced severe increases in cable theft in the 
last few years (Department of Energy, 2018:np). This motivated the researcher to 
conduct a study to determine the security threats and vulnerabilities that expose 
Medupi Power Station as a National Key Point to crime. Generally, security 
measures of National Key Points should be equivalent to the value of the assets that 
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are protected. That means that if Medupi Power Station wants to improve security 
measures to protect its property, a security risk assessment should be done to 
establish the nature and extent of threats and vulnerabilities confronting its 
operations. 
Medupi Power Station has seen an increase in the rate of crimes in recent years. 
Statistics have indicated that a high crime rate in Lephalale, where the power station 
is located, has made the power station susceptible to attacks by criminals. This has 
particularly affected Eskom and the on-site contractors. Criminals steal physical 
items, such as copper cables, equipment and fiscal assets, inside and outside the 
power station which has a negative impact on the surrounding community and other 
critical infrastructures (Kjolle, Utne & Gjerde, 2012:1). 
Rakoma (2016:np) points out that, although crime statistics in some areas around 
the site might decrease, the financial impact of these losses would increase as the 
actual financial loss suffered by the company would be severe. South Africa, like 
many other countries around the world, has experienced economic instability due to 
crimes and violent acts perpetuated against companies that threaten the employers 
and the employees, and damage the viability of the business (Mahambane, 2017:3). 
Violence and crime against power stations hampers the delivery of electricity which 
affects human rights (De Klerk, 2014). Delivery trucks entering and leaving National 
Key Points become targets for crimes perpetuated against the National Key Points 
and its employees (Kimiecik, 1995:178). Security companies and security guards 
who provide security services but are not vetted pose a security threat at National 
Key Points (Purpura, 2013:136). These companies and their employees should go 
through security checks before they provide such services to identify potential 
security breaches (Greggo, 2011:20). 
Based on the above-mentioned factors, the research problem sought to consider the 
level of security threats and weaknesses occurring at Medupi Power Station. 
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1.5 Research aim and objectives 
1.5.1 Aim of the study 
This study aims to evaluate levels of threat to security facing the Medupi Power 
Station as a Critical Infrastructure, in order to improve the existing security measures 
at the power plant. 
1.5.2 Objectives of the study 
Based on the aim, this study explored the security threats and vulnerabilities at 
Medupi Power Station, as a National Key Point, by focusing on the objectives below: 
 To evaluate the nature and range of security threats and vulnerabilities at 
Medupi Power Station; 
 To identify the security threats and vulnerabilities at Medupi Power Station 
that have caused the increase in crime at Medupi Power Station; 
 To evaluate the current physical security systems in place at Medupi Power 
Station; 
 To consider strategies for reducing security threats and vulnerabilities at the 
power utility. 
1.6 Research questions 
The following research questions served as guidance throughout the research 
process: 
 What are the security threats and vulnerabilities confronting Medupi Power 
Station in the Limpopo Province? 
 What security measures are currently in place at Medupi Power Station? 
 What should be done to improve security measures at Medupi Power Station? 
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1.7 The value of the research 
The study is deemed important since the findings will contribute to the identification 
of the security threats and vulnerabilities at Medupi Power Station, a Critical 
Infrastructure facility. It is envisaged the research will improve security measures at 
Medupi Power Station which will ensure that the power station conducts its day-to-
day business with reduced threats and vulnerabilities. It will add value to the lacunae 
of up-to-date research on threats and vulnerabilities facing power utilities. 
The research findings of the study will benefit society as threats and vulnerabilities 
will be identified and dealt with for the betterment of the community by maximisation 
of public interest and social justice. The researcher will benefit by becoming 
knowledgeable and experienced in the field of CI.  The research will be of value to 
the community by increasing job opportunities in order to enhance social 
responsibilities. UNISA will benefit through increased throughput. The researcher will 
write articles which will be published in accredited journals. 
In summary, the following stakeholders will benefit from the study: 
 The value to the researcher: The researcher will benefit from this research by 
acquiring skills, experience and achievement of academic qualifications; 
 The value to the UNISA: The University had benefited through increase in the 
research throughput and presentation of findings at various platforms when 
required; 
 The value to the security industry: The industry will benefit from the research 
findings by becoming aware of the kinds of threats and vulnerabilities at 
Critical Infrastructure; 
 The value to the academic society: Academic society will benefited through 
the methodological dimension as well as theoretical framework used in this 
study; 
 The value to the business and community at large: Both the business 




1.8 Definition of key theoretical concepts 
1.8.1 National Key Point 
According to the National Key Points Act 102 of 1980 (SA, 1980), a National Key 
Point is defined as “any place or area, which has under section 2 of the National Key 
Points Act 102 of 1980 (SA, 1980) been declared a National Key Point”. National key 
points include the Union Buildings, strategic installations, such as provincial 
legislatures, airports and power stations, and other buildings that require tight 
security to prevent damage or acts of sabotage (Hi-Tech Security, 2007:np). The 
following are examples of National Key Points in South Africa: the Union Buildings, 
OR Tambo International Airport, Legislations, SABC, Eskom National Control Centre 
at Simmer Pan, Matla Power Station, Duvha Power Station, Mokolo Pump Station, 
Matimba Power Station, Medupi Power Station, Koeberg Nuclear Power Station, 
Cape Town International Airport, among others. 
1.8.2 Critical Infrastructure (CI) 
The term “Critical Infrastructure” is defined by Tweneboah-Koduah and Buchanan 
(2018:2) as “large-scale socio-technical systems which provide services to the 
society which is important in its proper functioning”. According to Bergerbest-Eilon 
(2009:13), CI is a complex of interdependence, which requires a systematic 
approach. However, Spellman and Bieber (2010:1) indicate that CI consists of 
services and systems that are essential to the functioning of a society and which, if 
compromised, would render a serious impact on the whole country. For example, 
Eskom power failures as a result of criminal activities impact negatively on 
businesses, government and society in general. According to Mäkinen (2016:10), CI 
includes all “the functions and structures that are important to maintain the functions 
of the community”. 
1.8.3 Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) 
The term “Critical Infrastructure Protection” includes all forms of security and 
systems infrastructure used for the proper and effective running of the society 
(Schneidhofer & Wolthusen, 2015:2). However, Mäkinen (2016:11) indicates that 
CIP incorporates all the activities that are purposefully intended to confirm their 
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continuity, functionality and their integrity to reduce vulnerabilities and risks. 
1.8.4 Infrastructure 
According to Tabansky (2011:62), infrastructure is critical when its disruption leads to 
socioeconomic disturbances, which undermine the stability of the community. The 
criticality of infrastructure is when it plays a major role in society and its disruption 
collapses the whole system (Federal Republic of Germany, 2009:5). Critical 
Infrastructure is further defined as “any building, centre, establishment, facility, 
installation, pipeline, premises or systems required for the functioning of society, the 
Government or enterprises of the Republic” and includes consumer installations, 
major hazard installations, nuclear installations and offshore installations, among 
others. 
1.8.5 Security 
Purpura (2011:5) defines security as “the state of being safe from threat, terror or 
nervousness”. Nkwana (2015:6) defines security as the application of economic 
security measures that, when engaged as a whole, decrease the possibility of loss-
incurring events or decrease the effect of loss-incurring events that happen in any 
given area. According to Minimum Information Security Standards (MISS) Chapter 2 
(1998:15), security is defined as that situation that is free of threats or vulnerabilities 
to lives, property and data generated by the establishment and use of protective 
security measures. National security, which includes peace, stability, development 
and progress, incorporates not only the lack of threats, risk or danger, but also 
includes the basic principles and fundamental values related “to the quality of life, 
freedom, justice, prosperity and development” 
(https://www.gov.za/documents/intelligence-white-paper). When looking at the above 
three definitions from various authors the concept security strives for safety from 
threats and vulnerabilities that can affect a particular area and in this instance that is 
the Medupi Power Station as one of the National Key Points area. 
1.8.6 Physical security 
Physical security is defined as “security of people, property and amenities by making 
usage of security services, security systems and security techniques” (Purpura, 
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2001:262). Rouse (2014:np) regards physical security as “the security of personnel, 
hardware, programs, systems, and information from physical environments and 
proceedings that could affect severe losses or damage to a business, group, or 
establishment”. Physical security settings encompass fires, disasters, burglaries, 
thefts, vandalism, and violence. Fisher, Halibozek and Green (2008:31) explain that 
the concept of “security” includes “a steady, comparatively foreseeable environment 
in which an individual or group may follow its ends without disturbance or damage 
and without fear of trouble or injury”. 
1.8.7 Security assessment 
Security assessment is the process of gathering information about the risks; this is 
done by conducting interviews with key employees that are tasked to manage CI, 
reviewing existing documents and systems with the intention of comparing them with 
the available standards (Abouzakhar, 2013:7). 
1.8.8 Security risks 
According to Kole (2015:12), security risks include “the probability of suffering 
damage or loss, disclosure to the likelihood of loss or damage, a constituent of 
doubt, or the prospect that affects an act that may not be consistent with the 
envisioned or expected results”. Mahambane (2017:5) defines security risks as the 
“prospect of distress maltreatment or loss, revelation to the chance of loss or harm, 
an element of uncertainty, or the chances that effects an action that may not be 
consistent with the envisioned or expected results”. 
1.8.9 Security Vetting 
This refers to “the methodical procedure of investigation followed in determining a 
person's security competence” (MyHR, 2014:np). Security vetting is also “the 
scrutiny of the previous and background of constructive candidates and prevailing 
workforces” (Minimum Information Security Standards, 1998:17). Therefore, for most 
security positions, screening includes criminal record investigations for previous 




1.8.10 Security measures 
Van Jaarsveld (2011:5) states that security measures are intended to “thwart, limit 
and recuperate security-related losses”.  According to Mahambane (2017:5), security 
measures designate all the security measures that must be put in place in order to 
preclude, confine and recuperate security-associated losses. For the purpose of this 
study, security measures include the security of people, technology, procedures, 
policy and physical security aids. 
1.8.11 Security officer 
The Private Security Industry Regulation Act 56 of 2001 (SA, 2001), defines a 
security officer as any ordinary individual “who is employed by another person, 
including an organ of State, and who receives or is entitled to receive from such 
other person any remuneration, reward, fee or benefit, for rendering one or more 
security services”. Furthermore, the act defines security officer as a person  
“who assists in carrying on or conducting the affairs of another security 
service provider, and who receives or is entitled to receive from such 
other security service provider, any remuneration, reward, fee or benefit, 
as regards one or more security services” (SA, 2001). 
1.8.12 Security survey 
A security survey is defined as  
“a critical on-site examination and study of an industrial plant, business, 
home, or public or private institution in order to establish the current 
security status, identify deficiencies or excesses, determine the protection 
needed, and make recommendations to improve the overall security” 
(Fennelly, 2013:41).  
Adding to the above-mentioned definition, a security survey also refers to “an 
instrument used to physically study sites and valuations of all security systems and 




1.8.13 Security threats 
The Business Dictionary (2018a) defines security threats as  
“an undesirable occurrence that can cause a risk to become a loss, 
articulated as an aggregate of risk, consequences of risk, and the 
probability of the incidence of the occurrence. Additionally, a threat may 
be a normal occurrence such as an earthquake, flood, storm, or a 
fabricated incident such as burglary, theft, malicious damage to property, 
fire, power failure, sabotage, etc.” 
1.8.14 Threat 
According to Christopoulos (2013:19), threat is defined as “natural or man-made 
occurrence, individual, entity, or action that has or indicates the potential to harm life, 
information, operations, the environment and/or property”. 
1.8.15 Vulnerability 
According to Mahambane (2017:6), vulnerability is defined as “the degree to which 
people, property, resources, systems, and cultural, economic, environmental, and 
social activity is prone to damage, dilapidation, or destruction on being exposed to 
an hostile factor”. This means that assets, such as working tools, may be vulnerable 
to theft caused by a lack of security measures. 
1.8.16 Vulnerability assessment 
The Vulnerability Assessment (VA) is a proactive strategy for improving 
infrastructure security and its ability to provide the necessary information that may be 
used during the Risk Assessment process (Drago, 2015:10). According to 
Christopoulos (2013:19), vulnerability is the weaknesses that result in success of 
crime prevention. 
1.8.17 Access control 
HiTech Solutions (2007:62) explains access control as the process whereby  
“people are granted or denied access to restricted areas, such as office 
15 
 
suites, storage facilities, or parking garages. Office buildings can either 
house individual tenants and companies in a multi-use property, or be 
owned and occupied by a single company. Varying degrees of access are 
required depending on use, and administration of access control for 
personnel can be distributed amongst several individuals”.  
Access control is also defined as the control of things moving into and out of a 
building or another area (Fay, 2010:161). 
1.9 Conclusion 
This chapter provided an introduction, highlighted the rationale, problem statement 
and clarified the aims, objectives and benefits of the study. This research is for the 
benefit of CI protection and describes ways of improving the basic acts, as provided 
in section 1.7 above, which is backed up by literature and national legislation. This 
study of the security of Medupi Power Station in the Limpopo Province, a critical 
infrastructure, will enable it to prevent financial loss, infrastructural degradation and 
give the surrounding community and businesses access to basic amenities. The 
qualitative data from this study has been analysed to improve the protection of public 
infrastructures such as the Medupi Power Station in the Limpopo Province. 
1.10 Outline of the dissertation 
Chapter One: Introduction and Motivation for the Research 
This chapter discusses the rationale for the study, problem statement, research 
questions, research aims and objectives, key definitions and theoretical concepts 
and definitions used in the study. 
Chapter Two: Research Methodology 
This chapter discusses the research methodology, the research approach, design, 
data collection instruments, data collection, data analysis, reliability and validity of 




Chapter Three: Literature Review on Security at National Key Points 
This chapter provides a review of literature. This involves discussing the theoretical 
areas, interpretation and analysis of previous research done in the field of security 
for National Key Points. 
Chapter Four: Data Analysis and Research Findings 
The findings of the research are analysed based on the research information 
gathered during the collection methods applied in the study. 
Chapter Five: Conclusion and Recommendations 
This chapter consists of a summary and conclusion of the main findings of the study 







This chapter provides an overview of the research approach and design used in the 
study. It also discusses the population and sampling, pilot study and data analysis. 
The chapter discusses the validity, reliability and ethical considerations for the study 
and the limitations and value of the study. 
2.2 Research approach 
According to Kumar (2014), “a research approach outlines the techniques, 
procedures, philosophies and methods that a researcher will follow to achieve the 
research objectives”. The research approach for this study was explorative . 
Explorative research is aimed at gaining an insight and familiarity for later 
investigation and to use for further research (Sastry, 2013:110). The reason for using 
explorative research is that the researcher was able to ask the research questions 
and probe the participants for their knowledge of security threats and vulnerabilities 
at Medupi Power Station.   
2.3 Research design 
The researcher employed a qualitative research design for this study because the 
topic under study was not exhaustively researched and there is limited information 
on National Key Points as a topic. Research design is a way of designing and 
conducting an investigation (Creswell, 2014). On the one hand, Fowler and Aaron 
(2010) describe a research design as “a complete practical strategy for obtaining 
trustworthy solutions to the questions that have been propounded for the study; and 
for handling some of the difficulties that could be encountered during the research 
process”. On the other hand, Creswell (2013:44) indicates that qualitative research 
“begins with assumptions and the use of interpretive/theoretical frameworks that 
inform the study of research problems addressing the meaning individuals or groups 
ascribe to a social or human problem”. Qualitative research differs from quantitative 
research in that it does not use numerical illustration but focuses on having a 
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thorough understanding of the problem that the research is investigating (Jugder, 
2016:370). Sastry (2013:105) indicates that the importance of a research design 
helps the researcher to properly address concerns in the research and it provides 
guidance to the research in order to fill inaccuracies which were found during 
procuring of the data. 
2.4 Population and sampling 
2.4.1 Population 
A population is a group of units from which samples are drawn in order to conduct 
research (Guest, Namey & Mitchell, 2013:42). Melville and Goddard (2001:34) define 
population as “any group which is the subject of research study”. The population in 
this study included all employees that render a security service at Medupi power 
station.  
2.4.2 Sampling 
Bless and Higson-Smith (2000:83) define sampling as  
“the process of selecting the sample from a population in order to obtain 
information regarding a phenomenon in a way that represents the 
population of interest and to allow for an accurate generalisation of 
results”.  
This research employed purposive sampling as he only selected participants who 
had knowledge and experience of security threats at Medupi Power Station. Brink 
and Wood (1998:221) indicate that an alternative name for purposive sampling is 
“judgmental sampling” because samples are chosen for a specific purpose in a 
research study (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010:212). Thus, the sample for this study 
consisted of 30 individuals from the total population of 371. Only eighteen (18) 
participants agreed to participate and included senior security managers, security 
officers, crime investigation officers, security business intelligence officer, security 
technology officer, security inspectors, and contracted security service providers. 
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2.5 Pilot study 
Prior to the conducting of the project, the researcher conducted a pilot study to test 
the research questions in order to determine whether they would yield the 
anticipated results and also to modify them to ensure that they did not confuse the 
participants. A pilot study is important to improve the quality and efficiency of the 
study (Hazzi & Maldaon, 2015:53). It provides the methodological evidence about 
the research design, planning and justification of a pilot study (Blatch-Jones, 
Kirkpatrick & Ashton-Key, 2018:1). According to Doody and Doody (2015:1074), a 
pilot study “contributes valuable information to assist a researcher in the conduct of 
their study”. The other reasons for conducting a pilot study were that the researcher 
was able to test how the questions were answered by the participants. The 
researcher randomly selected a small sample of five respondents to conduct a pilot 
study before the main study was conducted. A pilot study was a useful exercise for 
the researcher to refine data collection questions (Ishmail, Kinchin & Edwards, 
2018:4). 
2.6 Data collection 
The research approach for the study was qualitative in nature and the process of 
collecting data is indicated below: 
2.6.1 In-depth, individual interviews 
According to Queiros, Faria and Almeida (2017:378), in-depth interviews provide the 
researcher with an opportunity to ask follow-up questions, probe the respondent for 
additional information, justify what was already discussed and establish a connection 
between different topics in the discussion. An in-depth interview uses direct 
questions which are used to elicit detailed information from the participants (DiCicco-
Bloom & Crabtree, 2006:315). 
2.6.2 Semi structured interviews 
Semi-structured interviews use non-standardised questions (Torkar, Zimmermann & 
Wilbrand, 2011:45). This means that semi-structured interviews involve a 
combination of structured and unstructured questions. An interview schedule was 
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used by the researcher when facilitating the interviews. In the semi-structured 
interviews, useful information was obtained through a two-way communication with 
the research participants (Pathak & Intratat, 2012:4). During the interviews with the 
participants, the researcher assured the participants that their privacy and 
confidentiality issues would be respected in terms of the Policy on Research Ethics 
(UNISA, 2016). Interviews were conducted in a quiet place to ensure that the 
participants were not distracted from the communication with the researcher. The 
interviews were recorded on an electronic device. The research interviews were 
facilitated through the use of an interview schedule which mainly focused on the 
research problem and research questions of the study in order to probe the 
participants on the threats and vulnerabilities at the Medupi Power Station. 
When conducting interviews, the researcher wrote down notes which were written in 
the presence of the participants to ensure that the participants were not coerced. 
This means that the research did not influence the participants to give detailed 
answers to research questions. No leading questions were asked of the participants 
as this would have had a negative influence on the results of this research.  
The researcher formulated detailed research question prior to conducting semi-
structured interviews (Pathak & Intratat, 2012:4). According to Kallio, Pietila, 
Johnson and Kangasniemi (2016:4), a good quality interview guide used during 
semi-structured interviews yields positive results. The researcher used open-ended 
questions which were posed to the participants and they provided the researcher 
with an opportunity to probe the participants about the subject matter. 
2.7 Data analysis 
Parahoo (2006) indicates that “data analysis was a cohesive part of research design 
and it is a way of making sense of data before presenting them in an understandable 
manner”. Data analysis is a “disintegration of data into controllable themes, patterns, 
trends and relationships” (Mouton, 2001:108). In a qualitative methodology, data 
analysis includes taking the interview transcripts together with observation notes and 
non-textual material collected and systematically sorting and arranging the data to 
gain a deeper understanding of the phenomenon under study. The researcher is 
certain that the interview questions did not mislead the participants. In order to 
21 
 
ensure that the data analysis method was valid, the researcher has used Thematic 
Analysis techniques that were tested by different authors, such as Braun and Clarke 
(2006), as discussed below: 
2.7.1 Thematic Analysis (TA) 
Data were analysed using the Thematic Analysis (TA) process that is defined as “a 
method for systematically identifying, organising and offering insight into, patterns of 
meanings across a dataset” (Braun & Clarke, 2012:22). Data analysis involves 
preparation and organising the data and then the thematic reduction of data by 
carrying out a process of coding and contracting the codes (Creswell, 2013:180).  
Nowell, Morris, White and Moules (2017:2) contend that TA is normally used to 
answer qualitative research questions.  
According to Braun and Clarke (2013:120), TA is very important in identifying and 
analysing patterns in the data. TA develops classification and themes that are 
related to the data (Ibrahim, 2012:40). Jugder (2016:3) believes that TA 
complements the research questions.  
2.7.2 Six phases of thematic analysis 
The following are the six steps used to analyse the collected data (Braun & Clarke, 
2006): 
1) Familiarisation with the data: When the researcher reads and re-reads the   
transcripts, he/she will become familiar with the data. This includes replaying the 
audio-tapes and going over the field notes several times. 
2) Coding: During data analysis, the researcher generates concise labels for 
important features of the data. The end-product of this process is to collate all the 
codes and relevant extracts from the data. 
3) Searching for themes: Searching for the codes happens when the researcher 
looks for the similarities in the data, however, such codes must be relevant to the 
research questions of the study. All the codes related to the theme are collated 
by the researcher. 
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4) Reviewing themes: This involves the checking of the themes based on the 
coded extracts and the full data set. Of importance is that the researcher will look 
at any theme that is convincing about the data. In some cases, themes may be 
separated or merged. 
5) Defining and naming themes: Once the researcher has conducted a detailed 
analysis of the data, he/she will be in a better position to define and name the 
themes. 
6) Writing up: Once the themes have been defined and named, the last step of the 
process is to write up the report based on the analysis. In this step, the 
researcher is able to narrate a story based on the extracted data (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006). 
2.8 Measures used to ensure validity 
Trustworthiness is considered as the overarching evaluative standard for field 
research (Sango, 2013). This requires conducting a research and presenting the 
study in a way that the reader can believe the results and be convinced that the 
research conducted was worthy. In this study, the objectives of the study and the 
knowledge collected during the literature review ensured that the interview questions 
represented national and international literature research findings regarding the 
assessment of security threats and vulnerabilities.  
Validity refers to the trustfulness, accuracy, authenticity, genuineness and 
soundness of a study (Delport & Roestenburg, 2011:171). Also, validity means that 
the data has revealed accurate or error free conclusions (Lani, 2009:3). According to 
Van Niekerk (2015:11), validity in research ensures that the research is based on 
quality data and their interpretations. 
Researchers mostly ascertain the validity of a study by asking a number of 
questions, and finding the answers in the research of previous researchers. Dantzker 
and Hunter (2012:53) classify validity into four parts, namely, face, content, construct 
and criterion validity. To ensure that validity is achieved, a pilot study is conducted in 
order to test the research instruments for content and construct validity (Dikko, 
2016:521). In the face of validity, the judgement of the researcher played a role as 
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the interview questions measured what the researcher wanted to measure. Similarly, 
criterion validity was achieved by ensuring a good relationship between the interview 
schedule and the result of the findings. The researcher carried out both the internal 
and external validity of the research instrument in order to make the research study 
scientifically reliable and trustworthy. In this study, the researcher confirmed that the 
research instruments that were presented to the participants allowed them to give 
consistent answers.  
2.9 Measures used to ensure reliability 
The reliability of a study is the act of constructing the same results on continuous 
conditions. The accounts provided by other researchers have pronounced reliability 
as the level to which results were dependable over time and a true idea of the whole 
population that was investigated and whether the study was able to be reproduced 
under the same conditions (Delport & Roestenburg, 2011). Reliability was also 
ensured since the measuring instruments that were used in the research study 
yielded consistent results when repeated by other researchers. 
Open-ended questions using in-depth, individual, semi-structured interviews were 
used. This enabled the researcher to focus on asking questions that were on the 
interview schedule. The researcher used the same interview schedule for all the 
participants. Prior to conducting semi-structured interviews with the participants, the 
researcher guaranteed their confidentiality and privacy. The researcher did not ask 
leading questions during the interviews with the participants. 
2.10 Ethical considerations 
According to De Vos, Strydom, Fouche and Delport (2011:115), research ethics is 
defined as “a set of moral principles which offers rules and behavioural expectations 
about the most correct conduct towards participants, organisations and or sponsor”. 
Research ethics requires that, during data collection, the researcher should respect 
participants’ privacy, rights, integrity and confidentiality.   
To ensure that the study was ethically acceptable, the researcher complied with the 
University of South Africa Policy on Ethics. This means that the researcher first 
applied for ethical clearance prior to conducting the study. The researcher also 
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sought written consent from the head of security to carry out the research in the 
limits of the study area. In conducting this research, the researcher complied with the 
following ethical principles (UNISA, 2016): 
 Protection of and respect for the rights and interests of participants and 
organisations 
The researcher showed respect for and safeguarded the dignity, privacy and 
confidentiality of both the participants and UNISA. This was done by ensuring that 
personal information of the participants was not shared with any other person. They 
participated of their own free will and the taped materials were destroyed after three 
months. In other words, no information related to the participants was exposed to 
any person or organisation for profit or personal gain. This means that the data were 
only collected for the purpose of an academic qualification. 
 Informed and non-coerced consent 
Participants participated in the study voluntarily without being coerced. This was 
done by designing an informed consent form which was signed by the participants 
who were also informed that their participation in this research was voluntary 
(Dongre & Sankaran, 2016:1191). Informed consent means that the researcher has 
a responsibility to make sure that participants are aware of the different phases of 
the research (Sanjari, Bahramnezhad, Fomani, Shoghi & Cheraghi, 2014:3). 
 Respect for cultural differences 
The researcher respected the cultures of other participants. The researcher 
requested permission from individuals to interview them. The study involved 
participants from different cultures such as Zulu, Xhosa, Pedi, Tsonga, Venda, 
Ndebele, Sotho and Tswana. The researcher, as an Eskom employee, which is a 
diversified organisation, was thus was able to conduct the interviews fairly and in a 
consistence manner. 
 Justice, fairness and objectivity 
The researcher ensured a fair selection of the participants by taking a representative 
sample from the population in a scientific manner. Participants were selected based 
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on their availability at Medupi Power Station at a specific time and the researcher’s 
knowledge. 
 Integrity, transparency and accountability 
The researcher was honest, fair and transparent during the conducting of the 
interviews.  In this study, the researcher collected data and did not make use of field-
workers. The researcher did not promise the participants any gifts or payment and 
they were informed of this when they completed an informed consent form. All the 
participants were acknowledged for their participation in the research. 
 Risk minimisation 
The participants were not exposed to any form of risk since they were interviewed at 
their place of employment in the boardroom and offices at a time suitable for them. 
The researcher was aware of the potential harm that might be inflicted upon the 
participants (Sanjari, Bahramnezhad, Fomani, Shoghi & Cheraghi, 2014:3). It was 
important to protect the participants by applying the ethical principles (Arifin, 
2018:30). 
2.11 Limitations of the study 
Limitations are issues that may emerge within a research that are beyond the 
researcher’s control (Simon & Goes, 2013:3).  Prior to conducting the research, the 
researcher conducted an extensive literature review of the topic. However, the 
literature review proved that there is limited information available about the topic of 
National Key Point security in South Africa.  
The study was limited to the security officers employed at Medupi Power Station at 
Lephalale, Limpopo Province. Data saturation limited the researcher from 
interviewing all the 30 individuals since the data was saturated at the 11th interview 
and there was not necessary to proceed with the interviews since no new themes 
were coming through. The results obtained were not generalised due to the 




This chapter discussed the research design and approach used in the study and 
gave the reasons that guided the researcher to use them. The research design and 
approach were presented regarding the population, the sampling method and that 
pilot study that was performed in order to test the questions on the interview 
schedule. The chapter also discussed the data collection and data analysis 
techniques. Of importance was the discussion of the measures that were used to 
ensure validity and reliability, and the ethical considerations that were adhered to 
during the study. The limitation and the value of research were also part of the 
discussion in this chapter. In the next chapter, the researcher discusses the literature 








The focus of this study was to examine security threats and vulnerabilities at a 
National Key Point, namely, Medupi Power Station which is one of the critical 
infrastructures in South Africa. A “Critical Infrastructure” (CI) refers to the 
infrastructures that provide essential services to the society to ensure their well-
being, in terms of public safety and services (Poustourli, Ward, Zachariadis & 
Schimmer, 2015:2; Hammerli & Renda, 2010:22). It involves the protection of 
physical assets which, if not protected, will impact negatively on the economy, health 
and security, public safety, service delivery and the general quality of life of the 
citizens (Alcaraz & Zeadally, 2015). Salient examples of critical infrastructure include 
communications, airports, emergency services, energy and financial institutions, 
among others. Therefore, any form of interference like vandalism or theft, can 
threaten the ideals of society and erode public confidence in the society (Hemme, 
2015). 
Critical infrastructure protection is the key to the sustainable management of key 
national infrastructure in any nation (Hemme, 2015:np). Critical infrastructure must 
be duly secured to deter any damage or vandalism due to natural disasters, political 
unrest and collateral damage during all forms of attack that can leave a country 
vulnerable (De Bruijne & Van Eeten, 2007:12). This chapter examines the available 
literature on CIP perspectives especially from the countries with advanced CIP 
systems, such as the United Kingdom (UK), Western Europe and the United States 
of America (USA), and their relevance to developing countries like South Africa.  
Protection of critical infrastructure is important because it ensures effective and 
efficient function of the economy. Rehak, Hromada and Novotny (2016:943) provide 
further examples of CI that include electricity generations, transmission and 
distribution of oil/gas, production, transport and distribution, telecommunication, 
water supply and waste water/sewage, food production and distribution, public 
health, transportation (fuel supply, railway network, airports), harbours, financial 
services, and security services including the police and the military.  
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The review of the literature indicates that the term Critical Infrastructure Protection 
differs from country to country especially those attributes which may be considered 
“critical”. Therefore, each country has a list of critical infrastructures that must be 
protected from risks, vulnerabilities and any potential hazard to ensure its safety, 
stability and smooth functioning.  
3.2 The importance of critical infrastructure 
The term “critical infrastructure” was coined by the Clinton administration in 1996 
(Aradau, 2010:500). Critical Infrastructure is a term referring to the importance of 
certain infrastructures which are defined as the systems, assets, facilities and 
networks that provide essential services, which are required for the national security, 
economic security, health and safety and prosperity (Shared Narrative, 2014:2). In 
essence, the concept of “critical” refers to the essential services which, if disrupted, 
can disturb the society and economy of countries. 
According to Hammerli et al (2010), infrastructure means “physical infrastructure, 
such as good roads, potable water installations, telecommunication masts, houses, 
and electrical supply plants, and often intangible assets” which are not physical and 
may be classified as either definite or indefinite. Examples of intangible assets are 
patented technology, computer software, databases and trade secrets, trademarks, 
trade dress, newspaper mastheads, internet domains, video and audio-visual 
material (e.g. motion pictures, television programmes), customer lists and mortgage 
servicing rights. Critical infrastructures are regarded as the providers of services that 
are of national importance (Zaballos & Jeun, 2016:1) therefore their failure will have 
a significant impact on national interests of the economy, security and the 
expectation of society (Rehak et al, 2016:3). 
Melchiorre (2018:12), describes the concept of critical infrastructure as 
“a system constituted of those facilities, services and information systems 
that are essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, 
safety, security, economy and social well-being of people and disruption 
or disruption has a debilitating impact on national security, national 




According to Katina and Hester (2012:1), research conducted on CIPs seeks to 
develop strategies to protect infrastructure systems by reducing hazards, risks and 
threats from both natural and man-made events.  Factors of criticality enable proper 
allocation of resources and serve as a necessary process in ensuring proper 
protection of assets before a threat is discovered and act as a mitigating factor 
during an event and during recovery from a threat event (Katina & Hester, 2012:2). 
In the context of this study, the infrastructure at Medupi Power Station at Lephalale 
serves as one of the main power stations in South Africa and it is responsible for 
generating electricity to a large area of the country. It is one of the largest electricity 
generation power plants of its kind in the southern hemisphere and in the world. At 
Medupi, the concept of infrastructure refers to the physical infrastructure used to 
store assets, machinery and equipment used to generate electricity. Any disruption 
in meeting its mandate to generate and provide electricity services to the community 
will have detrimental effects on the South African economy and society at large. For 
example, electricity has to generate power uninterrupted and free from any form of 
vulnerabilities. 
3.3 The significance of critical infrastructure protection 
Critical Infrastructure (CI) is a very important component of national security around 
the world as was recognised in 1999 by countries such as Canada, the United 
Kingdom (UK), Sweden and Switzerland (Izuakor, 2016:10; Steele, Hussey & 
Dovers, 2017). However, since the infamous terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 
in the USA, most European countries have redefined how they protect their critical 
assets and some have launched strategies to protect their critical infrastructures 
(CIs) to maintain important functions of society and ensure that everyday life is 
stable, safe and healthy (Heino, Takala, Jukarainen, Kalahti, Kekki & Verho, 2019:3). 
3.4 International perspectives on critical infrastructure protection 
Internationally, ensuring the security and protection of critical infrastructure has been 
largely shaped by the terror campaign unleashed on the developed world by Osama 
Bin Laden (CTED and UNOCT 2018). The attacks on the World Trade Centre on 
30 
 
September 11, 2001 created shockwaves across the civilised world and this forced 
many governments to review their critical infrastructure protection systems. 
According to Heino et al (2019:123), the disruption of CIs can have an impact on the 
social stability, national security and trust of the citizens based on whether the CIPs 
are able to uphold social stability (Heino et al, 2019:2). Therefore, any form of attack 
on the CI of a country can cause serious damage to the national security which may 
lead to the collapse of the entire infrastructure (Hemme, 2015:25; Melchiorre, 
2018:11).  
The protection of critical infrastructure is considered of strategic importance for any 
country because it safeguards the lifestyles, the quality of life and the constitutional 
rights of the citizens. When the citizens’ trust in government institutions is 
undermined by an interruption of service delivery due to damage to the infra-
structure or the compromised capacity of the utilities, this affects economic 
performance and can foster conditions that can make a country ungovernable. 
Disruptions of public services can also become a threat to the sustainability of 
democratic systems (Heino et al, 2019). 
In the United States of America, the energy sector has been declared “uniquely 
critical” by Presidential Policy Directive Twenty One due to its enabling function 
across 15 other critical infrastructures (Hemme, 2015:36). The energy infrastructure 
therefore becomes a strategic national resource whose assets have to be protected 
“against any form of attack as part of national defense planning since World War II 
and throughout and after the Cold War” (Zaballos et al, 2017:7).  
According to Zaballos et al (2016:1), critical infrastructure is referred to as “the basic 
physical and organizational structure required for a society to operate”. In the UK, 
Canada and USA, CI therefore has national security strategies (Brunner, Cavelty, 
Giroux & Suter, 2010:6). 
3.4.1 The European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP) 
On the 17 June 2004, three months after the Madrid train bombings, the European 
Council requested the European Commission to develop a strategy to protect CIs 
(Fritzon, Ljungkvist, Boin & Rhinard, 2007:32; Caldeira, 2013:5). This communication 
was regarded as the first step in the protection of the CIs within the European Union. 
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The European Union has taken measures to curb the rise of terrorism which is 
fuelled by Islamic extremists and jihadists. As a unionised bloc, it is sensible for the 
European Union to reply as a bloc. This allows the states that are not as financially 
strong and technologically advanced to profit from the CIP from the bloc as a 
collective and enjoy stronger nations’ technological infrastructure and resources. 
Reciprocally, this guarantees economic sustainability for the bloc which provides the 
Euro currency and makes the market a lucrative and favoured destination. Similarly, 
Karabacak et al (2009:291) found that, during these years, there was a request for 
the commission to prepare an overall strategy to protect CIPs in the European 
countries. Aradau (2010:491) indicates that the “EC lists the protection of 
infrastructures alongside the protection of the borders and that of citizens.” 
3.4.2 Critical Infrastructure in the United Kingdom (UK) 
The UK has one of the most advanced CIP systems in the world. (CTED and 
UNOCT, 2018). The CIs in the UK are categorised in terms of the national 
infrastructure based on their contribution to the national economy (Ani, Watson, 
Nurse, Cook & Maple, 2019:3). These CIs are defined as those “facilities, systems, 
sites, and networks which are necessary for the effective functioning of the country in 
their efforts to deliver essential services upon which daily life depends” (Shared 
Narrative, 2014:12). According to Zaballos et al (2016:41), the UK policy on CIP is 
primarily focused on the economic significance and contribution of any identified 
critical infrastructure. This generates conditions necessary for policies that favour the 
economic growth of the UK. Consequently, the UK is able to prioritise CIP due to the 
perceived economic contribution that it makes to the GDP. In other words, economic 
reforms will never compromise the vital support that the CIP enjoys because it is an 
integral part of the economy (Steele et al, 2017). 
The UK’s advanced state of infrastructures enhances the national production, 
increases global competition and thus allows business growth by enabling suppliers 
and deepening the labour and product markets (Zaballos et al, 2016:41). This 
indicates that infrastructures at the UK are at the stage where growth is increasing 
which positively enables economic growth. 
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3.4.3 Critical Infrastructure Protection in the United States of America (USA) 
Critical Infrastructure Protection in the USA goes back to the late 1990s when it 
originally gained recognition among American scholars. It became increasingly clear 
that the government can reduce the risk of incurring physical damage to strategic 
infrastructure which can be perpetrated by enemies created by the military 
aggression and American foreign policy (Flick & Morehouse, 2010:np). The purpose 
of employing security at the CIs is to provide physical defence. This perspective 
endorses the fact that CIP has a natural strategic role that requires strategic 
protective intervention measures to deter vandalism or terrorist activities targeted at 
undermining the functionality of American society (Leventakis, Nikitakos & Sfetsos, 
2017:14). 
In the context of the USA, the concept of “CI” was first used in October 1997 in the 
document entitled “Critical Foundations: Protecting America’s infrastructures” 
(Karabacak et al, 2009:280). The  events that took place on September 11, 2001 in 
the USA resulted in the production of documents by international organisations, 
including governments and research institutions, on the vulnerabilities and protection 
of the CIs in the USA that require stakeholder engagement from variety of role 
players on how to protect the CIs. This is crucial because it improves the chances for 
developing robust CIP systems which, in turn, increase the quality of national 
security and lower the risk of compromise on any level (Zaballos & Jeun, 2016:np). 
In the USA, under the framework of the CI Advisory Council, there are Sectorial 
Coordinating Councils consisting of government and sector charters. In this way, 
more effort is made in the protection of the CIPs. However, protecting CIs is the 
responsibility of all the federal, public and private owners and operators of the CIs 
(Zaballos et al, 2016:29). The understanding between various departments and how 
they are interconnected, interrelated and interdependent helps the country to realise 
progress on the CIP objectives. This also minimises risks of security compromises 
and helps the country to fight any threats systemically (Bhaskar & Kapoor, 2014:67). 
In addition to the above-mentioned, the USA government introduced the Risk 
management framework in the protection of CIs .The USA CIP strategy evolved in a 
very short space of time in an effort to make up for the intelligence failure that 
resulted in the 9/11 terrorist attacks on American soil. In this regard, the USA has 
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become a pioneering champion in advanced CIP and has prioritised the significance 
of Infrastructure Protection policies more than any other nation. The United States 
Guidance of the Presidential Policy Directives (PPD) 21 provides the CIP with 
flexible policies and research to address threats to CIs (Hemme, 2015:25). Flexibility 
of CIP policies and decentralisation helps to combat and curb future foreign or 
domestic terrorist threats that may undermine infrastructure protection, target 
vulnerabilities and endanger the lives of the citizens. 
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) provides for a comprehensive risk 
management framework which defines the roles and responsibilities of the 
stakeholders of the CIs (Brunner & Cavelty, 2011:4). Thus, the USA NIPP is a risk 
management methodology which “enables the process for combining threats” 
(Poustourli et al, 2015:5). The USA has become one of the leading nations in the 
mastery of risk management methodology ever since 9/11 marked a new beginning 
in the age of CIP. 
Hemme (2015:25) concurs that, in the USA, CIs is essential for security to be 
protected from both internal and external threats and also to ensure the physical 
repair of damaged CIs to prevent further disruption of essential services. 
Giannopoulos et al (2012:6) indicate that the purpose of the CIP framework allows 
for the partners of the department to identify, prioritise and protect the CIPs within 
communities against terrorist attacks. 
It is critical for the USA to take CIP seriously in order to prevent domestic or foreign 
threats that may cause harm to the key economic and security apparatus which may 
result in socioeconomic dysfunction. This will help preserve peace and keep 
production levels high which is good practice for economic well-being and quality of 
life of the citizens. A country should prioritise CIP in order to ensure that its citizens’ 
quality of life, health and social well-being are not compromised. This helps the 
country to have stronger institutions derived upon trust. Any government that 
chooses to compromise its CIPs duties is short-sighted and in a very weak and 
fragile position.  
The strategic infrastructures stated and deemed as critical will mainly depend on 
geopolitical factors and the description and nature of a country’s major economic 
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activities. Hence, each country’s strategy has to factor in approaches that may be 
different from its neighbours or the rest of the world. For instance, an island nation 
like Singapore may have a different CIP system and evaluation criteria compared to 
a country that is landlocked like Zambia (Bhaskar & Kapoor, 2014). 
It is evident from the literature that South Africa lags behind with Critical 
Infrastructure Protection (CIP). Europe, UK and the USA being the masters of CIP 
are at an advanced level of managing CIPs. In Europe, this is called the “European 
Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP)” and in the US it is called 
“Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP)”. 
These countries developed a comprehensive risk management framework as the 
methodology to protect the CIPs. They also developed a National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan which caters for all the CIPs which includes the sharing of resources 
across CIPs. In the European Union (EU), CIPs have policies to protect CIPs which 
includes food safety and disaster response to protect CIPs. 
In these countries, CIPs are interrelated and managed by the government. In Europe 
for instance, these include energy, food, Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT), pipes and pumps, water, defence, public safety, health, 
telecommunication, transport, financial sector, vital human services, and the 
chemical and nuclear industries. These CIPs are managed by different bodies, for 
example, in the US, they are managed by the President’s Commission on Critical 
Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) and, in Europe, the European Council on the 
Protection of Critical Infrastructure Framework manages the CIP. It is clear that 
these countries are advanced in CIPs as compared to South Africa. The CIPs in 
these countries are not the responsibilities of the police, as in South Africa, but they 
have established bodies reporting to the commissions on CIPs. In support of the 
stricter rules and policies, these countries protect the CIPs with security measures 
such as the security and physical measures in the same way as in South Africa.  
To summarise the above, South Africa did not develop policies on CIPs as guided by 
the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act. The CIPs are functioning in isolation and 




Despite the fact that South Africa has legislations on the prevention of threats and 
vulnerabilities, they still persist for National Key Points. This legislation was meant to 
protect these infrastructures against sabotage. Some of the threats and 
vulnerabilities in CIPs in South Africa have been evident. Eskom has been 
experiencing malicious attacks on its security grids which can cripple CIPs in South 
Africa. The South African NKP was also exposed to abuse by Ministers who need 
their homes to be declared NKPs and believe that their protection is more important 
than that of ordinary citizens. Some of the breaches to NKP are service delivery 
protests, student protests, and the third force to these protests.  
3.5 Legislative framework on the protection of critical infrastructure in 
South Africa 
3.5.1 National Key Points Act 102 of 1980 
The  necessity for protecting CI in South Africa was introduced through legislations 
such as the National Key Points Act 102 of 1980 (SA, 1980) and, more recently, the 
Critical Infrastructure Protection Act, No. 8 of 2019 that makes provision for the 
protection of state assets against any form of attack. The National Key Points Act 
102 of 1980 (SA, 1980) was the first piece of legislation introduced by the apartheid 
government to identify certain areas of critical importance as national key points (Du 
Plessis, 2013).  
In their fight against apartheid, black South Africans made the country ungovernable 
through protests that caused social unrest, violence against security officers, 
vandalism of strategic institutions and so-called terrorist acts by the military branch of 
the ANC (Du Plessis, 2013). Because of this, the apartheid government was forced 
to divert additional military resources to protect national key points in order to avoid a 
complete shutdown of the economy at the time when the country was already 
plagued by sanctions and isolation due to its apartheid policies (Du Plessis, 2013). 
The purpose of the NKP Act was to give the Minister of Defence more powers to 
declare certain areas to be national key points and to impose certain security 
requirements for them (Pothier, 2013:1). 
The National Key Points Act 102 of 1980 (SA, 1980) was introduced to protect key 
state infrastructures, which are of the strategic importance to the country, against 
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sabotage. These areas include airports, energy and water resources, the military, 
dams, financial services, emergency services and health care, among others. At the 
heart of the National Key Points Act 102 of 1980 (SA, 1980) was the protection of 
infrastructure and government assets from theft, vandalism and other threats. 
Therefore, the essential purpose of the National Key Points Act 102 of 1980 (SA, 
1980) was to assess and identify risks, threats and the vulnerabilities of national key 
points in the Republic of South Africa. By factoring in the significance of key 
infrastructure, such as telecommunications, energy production and banking, South 
Africa positions itself as an investor friendly destination because the infrastructure 
protection policy helps to de-risk the costs incurred in doing business in the country 
(Oforis, Hindle & Hugo, 1996). 
3.5.2 Critical Infrastructure Protection Act, 2019 (No. 8 of 2019) 
A concern was raised by the apartheid government in the late 1970s about the 
possibility of sabotage by the banned African National Congress across South 
African borders which led to the introduction of the National Key Points Act 102 of 
1980 (SA, 1980), which was introduced to protection key strategic government 
installations, such as oil refineries, nuclear plants and electricity generation plants in 
South Africa. This was replaced by the CIP Act No. 8 of 2019. 
The main purposes of the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act No. 8 of 2019 are:  
“to provide for the identification and declaration of infrastructure as critical 
infrastructure; to provide guidelines and factors to be taken into account to 
ensure transparent identification and declaration of critical infrastructure; 
to provide for measures to be put in place for the protection, safeguarding 
and resilience of critical infrastructure”.  
These factors are used to identify and declare critical infrastructure (Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Act No. 8 of 2019: np). The figure below shows how critical 




Figure 2: The identification and determination of critical infrastructure complex 
(Source: Critical Infrastructure Protection Act No. 8 of 2019: ch 3(16) (2)). 
Ponthier (2013:1) indicates that some of the national key points include power-
stations, harbours, airports, factories producing ammunition and explosives, oil 
refineries and other important government properties that include Parliament and the 
Reserve Bank. The criteria to identify an area to be national key point in terms of 
section 2 of the Act 8 of 2019 is that the Minister of Defence has the power to 
declare a structure, installation or building a national key point when it can affect the 
economy, intelligence and the development of the country (Boda & Dullabh, 2019). 
Chapter 1 of Protection of Critical Infrastructure Bill is to ensure  
“(a) the adequate protection of Critical Infrastructure within the Republic; 
(b) the creation of procedures for the determination and protection of 
Critical Infrastructure that are open and transparent; and (c) accountable 
administration of Critical Infrastructure while ensuring that the security of 




3.5.2.1 Strategic Installations Bill (Notice 432 of 2007) 
The main purpose of this Bill is to protect places and premises and areas that are 
deemed to be of strategic interest against sabotage or other forms of attack. These 
are energy infrastructures and all areas as stipulated in Chapter 3 of this bill. It is 
therefore the responsibility of government to ensure that the necessary measures 
are put in place to enhance security of these areas. In terms of Chapter 3 of this Bill, 
the Minister of Police has the power to declare National Key Points, Strategic 
Installations and places of strategic importance that meet the criteria based on the 
committee evaluation. 
More still has to be done by way of progressive legislation to ensure that the security 
and quality of life in the young South African democracy is not compromised. 
However, the steps that the government has taken to date prove that we are going in 
the right direction. Hence it will be necessary to make sure all our practices are at 
par with the best in the world since this is likely to strengthen our place as an 
economic powerhouse in the southern hemisphere and boost our branding efforts 
Ponthier (2013:1). 
3.6 Theoretical basis for the study 
The incidents of crime taking place at Medupi Power Station can be attributed to the 
weakness in crime prevention measures as a result of security threats and 
vulnerabilities affecting the power generating plant. To this extent, the Opportunity 
Theory, Routine Activity Theory and Rational Choice Theory are examined to explain 
such anti-social behaviour at Medupi Power Station. 
3.6.1 Crime Opportunity Theory 
This theory suggests that offenders make a rational choice and choose targets that 
offer high levels of rewards with little risk (Gritzalis, Theoharidou & Stergiopoulos, 
2019:65). In the context of Medupi, this poses serious threats to the assets and 
offenders are well motivated to commit crimes in an environment that creates an 
opportunity for crimes to be perpetrated. Opportunity theorists Marcus Felson (1947) 
and Lawrence E. Cohen (1974) argue that the key issues that must be present in the 
commission of crime are motivation, opportunity and a lack of guards. The crimes 
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committed by international crime syndicates target items with high returns and little 
effort plus highly manageable risks. If the CIP is more advanced and the regulations 
and legislation around CIP and charges are stricter, this reduces the likelihood of 
crime. Longer prison sentences, tighter restrictions and an aggressive approach to 
the CIP regulation and training of personnel will most likely reduce the risk of CI 
theft. It is arguably a highly productive approach to pursue opportunity crime theories 
against other prevailing perspectives in order to resolve the crime motivation 
phenomenon. 
It seems evident that more scholarly work must be done in this area in order to prove 
the validity of the theories. Advances in this area will increase the capabilities of the 
advisors on such aspects to key organisations and state organs. This way the CIP 
goal can be realised more readily and more effectively. It is imperative that the 
critical infrastructure security features will readily increase the reliability of CIP and 
hence further the overall objective of improved security. 
Site designs allow for access control, target hardening, and surveillance potential. 
Access control refers to the control of movement into, out of, and within a specified 
area that facilitates the convergence of offenders and targets/victims. Similarly, 
target hardening is “the mechanism through which access to individual property 
targets can be restricted for all but legitimate owners and users” (Reynald, 2015:79). 
Surveillance is related to the design and layout of buildings, streets, and walkways 
(Jacobs, 1961). It describes the way that people in a particular area can see and be 
seen. It also includes technological devices such as lighting and security cameras. 
Surveillance, to a greater extent, defines why western countries have managed to 
take the lead in providing security before the rest of the world. Surveillance 
technology increases the barriers to theft and vandalism because the chances for 
apprehension by authorities are high unless there is malfunction or purposeful 
criminal intention to undermine the surveillance infrastructure. 
Research has shown that access control, target hardening, and surveillance may 
provide opportunities for crime. Routes in and out of an area, traffic and proximity to 
a highway are positively related to crime while restricting access and the use of 
locks, alarms and marking of property can reduce crime (Bowers et al, 2004, 
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Donnelly & Kimble, 1997, Johnson & Bowers, 2010; Eck & Guerette, 2012). 
Surveillance infrastructure is a key component of CIP protection that can minimise 
losses that the state or its organs may incur if the surveillance technology has been 
compromised. It is therefore necessary for procurement for infrastructure in the 
government or state organs to invest in surveillance technology as the evidence of 
its general effectiveness is compelling. 
According to Felson and Clarke (1998:9-22), the following are the ten principles of 
opportunity and crime: 
1. Opportunities play a role in causing all crime 
Crime and opportunity are related to one another. In the context of Medupi, most of 
the hazards and threats that occur are due to the fact that opportunity prevails to an 
extent that it motivates offenders to commit theft of assets which, in turn, creates 
more threats to the whole CI operation. Although opportunity plays an important role 
in every crime, the nature of opportunity determines the type of crime that occurs. 
2. Crime opportunities are highly specific 
Crime does not take place without an opportunity. Felson and Clarke (1998:9-22) 
agree that opportunity plays a major role but that no single crime opportunity factor 
applies to all forms of crimes. According to these authors, crime opportunities are 
specific to each offence and offender subset. For example, in the context of Medupi, 
an offender may look for something in the plant to steal or may be interested in 
stealing cables or property, such as office or plant contents, to sell to pawnshops or 
at flea markets. 
3. Crime opportunities are concentrated in time and space 
Crime opportunities are not equally distributed for the following reasons: 
 Some people and properties are not suitable targets for criminal attacks: 
For example, during the day in the presence of employees, offenders are 
unwilling to commit crimes and some locations have security guards or other 
security features (Felson & Clarke, 1998:14).  
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 The spatial and temporal distribution of people and things is highly 
uneven and sets the stage for crime to occur at a particular place and 
time: For example, a robber may commit robbery in a place with weak 
security measures when security guards move away from their posts. In order 
to breach strong security measures, the offender may apply aggressive force 
to gain entry into the restricted areas during the night.  
 Crime opportunities depend on everyday movements: A place that has 
little movement creates a space for crime and a place where there is a high 
movement of people reduces the possibility of crime occurring. The flow of 
workers in and out of the plant acts as a barrier for crimes to occur (Felson & 
Clarke, 1998:16).  
 One crime produces opportunity for another: An offender can find 
opportunities to commit other crimes in the course of committing a criminal 
act; one crime can generate multiple crimes (Felson & Clarke, 1998:17). For 
example, criminals may threaten or kill victims or security guards, assault and 
tie them up or rape female security guards.  
 Some products offer more tempting crime opportunities: According to 
Felson and Clarke (1998:19), any form of valuables that can be transformed 
into cash may be stolen. This is also true of the Medupi Power Station 
whereby offices are left open, valuable items lying on the table, such as 
laptop, computers and cellphones.  
 Social and technological changes produce new crime opportunities:  As 
technology frequently produces new products, these become targets for theft 
(Felson & Clarke, 1998:22). Old technology is not as attractive to thieves so is 
unlikely to get stolen. Computer theft has been an issue of concern for the 
Medupi Power Station. 
 Opportunities for crime can be reduced: Security measures put in place  
using “problem-oriented policing, defensible space, crime prevention through 
environmental design and situational crime prevention” (Felson & Clarke, 
1998:23) should reduce the opportunities for criminals. Medupi has CCTV 
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surveillance cameras, alarms and other security measures which are 
designed to reduce the opportunities for crimes to be committed. 
 Reducing opportunities does not usually display crime: According to 
Felson and Clarke (1998:25), the theory of crime displacement means that the 
different ways of reducing crime opportunities often just move crime from one 
area to the next. This is called “geographical displacement, temporal 
displacement, target displacement, tactical displacement and crime type 
displacement” (Felson & Clarke, 1998:25). 
 Focused opportunity reduction can produce wider declines in crime: 
Apart from crime displacement, sometimes the reverse of displacement may 
occur. In other words, it is important that the prevention measures also be 
used in areas away from the places where opportunities exist (Felson & 
Clarke, 1998:30). For example, when CCTV cameras were introduced to 
monitor thieves in the Medupi Power Station, crime declined not only in an 
area that is covered by surveillance cameras but in adjacent locations as well. 
3.6.2 Routine Activity Theory (RAT) 
Routine activity theory seeks to find explanations for the causes of crime. It also 
highlights that crime is caused by three elements: a suitable target, a lack of 
protection and a motivated offender (Argun & Daglar, 2016:1189). Offenders in this 
theory are not influenced by socio-economic factors such as poverty, unemployment 
and other ills. Once the three elements are present, crime becomes an alternative 
hence people become attractive targets for those motivated (Hsieh & Wang, 
2018:335). RAT is an important tool to reduce crime, evaluate crime problems and 
take routine precautions that reduce crime opportunities in people’s daily lives 
(Argun & Daglar, 2016:1189). According to Savard (2018:57), criminologists use 
RAT to study why a criminal event takes place. In the context of Medupi, this study 
examined the occurrence of crime as a result of security threats and vulnerabilities. 
3.6.3 Rational Choice Theory (RCT) 
The RCT theory focuses on the offender’s decision-making prior to committing a 
crime (Felson & Clarke, 1998:7). According to Kumar, Kelly, Clare, Wuschke and 
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Garis (2019:4), RCT contributes to rational choice to explain the crime by assuming 
that the decision to commit crime is made by a person who thinks that they can reap 
a reward that outweighs the risks involved. Offenders are driven by their situations 
and environments to analyse the potential risks and compare them with the profits of 
the act (Gul, 2009:37). Burns and Roszkowska (2016:196) argue that the purpose of 
this theory is to determine an individual’s choices and their social behaviour. 
According to Burns and Roszkowska (2016:197), RCT has the following multiple 
components: an actor in a decision situation identifies the possible and clear options, 
determines their preference for the likely outcome resulting from each of the 
alternatives, compares the consequences of each option and then decides which 
option provides the highest net gain (Burns & Roszkowska, 2016:197). 
3.7 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to discuss critical infrastructure and the importance 
of CIP. The international perspectives on CIP were discussed drawing lessons from 
the EU, UK, USA and South Africa. It is clear from international literature that South 
Africa lags behind in terms of CI and its protection. The criteria used to identify CI in 
South Africa are different to those of other countries. The EU and its member states 
have a model of CIP which should be given serious attention by our government.  
The threat of apartheid may be over but, in this new era, we are seeing an ever 
increasing global crisis of terrorism that is affecting both the developed and the 
developing world. Even on our doorstep, since oil was discovered in Mozambique, 
that country has been experiencing terrorist activity. If oil is discovered in South 
Africa, it may spark similar conflicts hence it is critical for the CIP legislation and 
policy to be quickly promulgated and implemented to protect the country’s well-
being. 
The role that CIP plays in this modern world can be the difference between a loss-
making and a profit-making parastatal. It is evident that CIP intelligence failures and 
compromised CIPs, such as 9/11, are disastrous for the economies of entire blocs, 




The government and the stakeholders, like universities, must  undertake advanced 
CIP studies in the unique localised context of the South African national 
infrastructure. This will generate data that the stakeholders and key decision-making 
boards can use to leverage the maximisation of CIP to concretise the approaches 
and develop robust strategies for progressive CIP initiatives. Whilst studies from 
other countries that have far more advanced CIP may be of great help, the challenge 
is that our geopolitical interests are different and hence the approaches we use will 
differ. 





DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the data analysis and discusses the research findings of data 
collected during the study. The findings answer the questions on security threats and 
vulnerabilities at a national key point with a case study of Medupi Power Station. To 
collect data, the researcher conducted eighteen (18) telephonic and face-to-face 
interviews using purposive sample techniques with employees who perform security 
functions at the power station. The findings are divided into two sections. In Section 
A, the researcher discusses the demographic make-up of the sample by evaluating 
variables such as, sex, age, marital status and educational background. Section B 
discusses and analyses the responses provided by respondents to the questions 
contained in the interview schedule based on the aims and objectives of the study. 
The focus of the study was to evaluate security threats and vulnerabilities occurring 
at Medupi Power Station. To do this, the researcher formulated the following 
objectives which were linked to the research questions: 
 To evaluate the nature and extent of security threats and vulnerabilities at 
Medupi Power Station 
 To identify the security threats and vulnerabilities that contribute to the 
increase in crime at Medupi Power Station. 
 To evaluate the present physical security systems in place at Medupi Power 
Station 
 To consider strategies for reducing burglary and theft at the power utility. 




4.2 Section A: Demographic details 
Table 1: Summary of demographic details of participants 
Participant 
Number  
Age Gender Marital 
status 
Current position at Medupi 
1 23-27 years Male Married Security Officer 
2 38 years Female Single  Investigator  
3 28-32 years Male Unknown Security Officer 
4 Unknown Male Unknown Security Officer 
5 44 years Male Married Security Officer 
6 53 years Male Married Senior  Manager 
7 Unknown Male Unknown Security Officer 
8 57 years Male Married Senior Inspector 
9 42 years Male Married Security Officer 
10 Unknown Male Married Security Officer 
11 42-48 years Male Married Intelligence 
12 42 years Male Married Security Officer 
13 34 years Female Married Security Officer 
14 39 years Male Unknown Security Officer 
15 Unknown Male Married Security Officer 
16 37-42 years Female Single Technology 
17 45 years Male Unknown Contractor  
18 18-22 years Unknown Married Security Officer 
In this study, there were fifteen (15) males and three (3) female participants. The 
reason for this was that there were fewer females employed in the security 
department and those participants selected were available and agreed to participate 
in the interviews. With regard to the age of the participants, two were aged between 
33 and 37 years, four were aged between 38 and 42 years, one was aged between 
43 and 52 years and three were aged 53 and above. The ages of other participants 
47 
 
were between 18 and 22 years, 23 and 27 years and 28 and 32. It is clear from the 
information on the age categories that all the participants were adult and mature 
enough to understand security threats and vulnerabilities at the Medupi Power 
Station.  
Eleven of the participants were married, two were single and the status of five 
participants was unknown. Most of the participants were married. With regard to the 
qualifications of the participants, six of the participants had certificates; one had an 
advanced diploma; four had diplomas and one participant had grade 12. The 
qualifications of six of the participants were unknown. The majority of the participants 
acquired certificates other than diplomas and advanced diplomas. It is clear that 
these participants have limited levels of education. In summary, most of the 
participants were married and aged between 38 and 42 with certificates as their 
qualifications.  
4.3 Section B: Findings 
In this section, the researcher discusses and interprets the research findings of the 
study. 
4.3.1 Discussion and interpretation of findings 
The findings are discussed in relation to the research objectives and linked to the 
research questions. The data were collected and recorded using a mobile phone and 
an audio-tape recorder. All the data were transcribed verbatim and subjected to 
thematic analysis procedures as outlined in Chapter 2. The purpose of applying the 
thematic analysis was to make sense of the data. It involved identifying, organising, 
verifying, analysing and reporting themes and sub-themes. The analysis was based 
on the following research questions:  
4.3.1.1 What types of crimes occur at Medupi Power Station? 
Theme 1: Criminal activities at Medupi Power Station 
The purpose of this question was to establish the types of crimes that are 
experienced at Medupi Power Station. In this theme, the categories of theft of copper 
cable and working tools emerged during analysis of the data. 
48 
 
(a) Copper cable theft 
Almost all the participants indicated that copper cable theft is a serious problem at 
Medupi. Critical infrastructure (CI) involves the protection of physical assets which, if 
not protected, will impact negatively on the economy, health and security of the 
citizens (Alcaraz & Zeadally, 2015). The participants also stated the modus operandi 
of thieves who steal copper cables, and how they steal it. Pretorius (2012:56) found 
that the theft of important assets, such as copper cables, remains a serious 
challenge facing the economy of South Africa as it has a negative impact on a 
variety of disciplines. According to Pretorius (2012:2), copper cable theft constitutes 
more than 90% of all copper theft, and the remainder consists of copper items in 
direct support of the copper cable network. Because copper cable theft brings with it 
safety problems to the general public (Narayan, 2013:1), it is of serious concern to 
the community and the power station. 
The following verbatim statements reflect the experiences of the participants: 
“… you can say, because people, they're stealing cable” - P8 (Senior 
Inspector), responsible for infrastructure inspection related information. 
“[theft] such as copper cable, mostly is committed by contractors” - P1 
(Security Officer), guarding and protection of assets and people. 
“There is a lot of theft with copper cable” - P16 (Technology), 
infrastructure technology related information. 
Criminals steal physical items, such as copper cables, equipment, fiscal 
assets inside and outside the power station” - P9 (Security Officer), 
guarding and protection of assets and people. 
“Copper cables – the actual financial loss suffered by the company is 
severe” - P12 (Security Officer), guarding and protection of assets and 
people. 
According to the participants, copper cable theft is a crime which takes place both 
during the day and at night at Medupi Power Station. They further indicated that 
copper cable theft has dire consequences for the power station.  
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(b) Theft of working tools 
The participants indicated that theft of contractors’ working tools is rife at the power 
station due to the number of contractors employed at Medupi. Also, contractors’ 
employees steal from other contractors. Participants believed that this is due to 
negligence. Theft of this nature is associated with economic loss and displeasure 
(Narayan, 2013:1). The participants said that: 
“Working tools at Medupi Power Station may be exposed to a security 
threat such as theft” - P5 (Security Officer), guarding and protection of 
assets and people. 
“This is an indication that store men are careless when tools are missing” 
- P2 (Investigation), crime investigation related information.  
“They're just leaving their tools” - P3 (Security Officer), guarding and 
protection of assets and people. 
“… and when these letters are being investigated, you'll find that 
equipment were left unattended” - P10 (Security Officer), guarding and 
protection of assets and people. 
“… and some resources like machines, grinding machines, used daily by 
their contractors” - P16 (Technology). 
“Crime theft that I I've been on, like theft of cables and theft of the electric, 
eh, appliances, lights, grinder’s drills” - P14 (SO). 
The participants believed that tools are stolen as and when an opportunity prevails. 
Some of the tools are left deliberately to sabotage the contractor. They indicated that 
it is not possible to accuse any person in possession of tools as all the contractors 
use same tools. The following participants explained the reasons for leaving the tools 
behind. 
The participants said that:  
“Tools are stolen because they used to share those tools” - P17 
(Contractor), provide security services. 
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“They are stealing the materials meant to do the work” - P18 (SO). 
This is because those responsible for the safe-keeping of tools shift the responsibility 
to those who use them. In other words, when tools are shared, no one takes 
responsibility for the loss and they blame each other.  
Participants said that: 
“… and the other thing, just stealing tools from one company to another” – 
P7 (SO).  
According to the participants, the fact that companies employ many people means 
that tools may be stolen by employees of another company. The participants also 
maintained that theft of tools does not only affect the contractor but it also affects the 
power station and the community. Employees or contractors at Medupi are not 
vetted and they do not care about the impact of crime.   
Theme 2: Description of the modus operandi of crime 
The purpose of this question was to understand how the assets are stolen at 
Medupi. Modus operandi is the method used by criminals to steal copper cable. It is 
the way in which a crime has been committed and comprises choices and 
behaviours that are intended to assist in the completion of crime (Van Der Watt, Van 
Graan & Labuschagne, 2014:62). Thieves use different modi operandi to steal 
copper wire. The modus operandi of the suspects can be used to pro-actively profile 
the suspect to increase successful prosecution (Liebenberg, 2018:17). Participants 
indicated that thieves make sure that they are not seen. They cut the cable into 
pieces and conceal them in small quantities in containers, such as two-litre Coke 
bottles, as they are able to take it out without being seen. From the analysis of data 
under this theme, the following category and sub-categories were identified: 
(a) Cut cables and put in bags, of two litre Coke bottle and lunch box 
Almost all the participants indicated that employees cut copper cables into pieces 
and rolled them to fit in a bag or a two litre Coke bottle. This finding is new and it will 
therefore add to the existing gap in the literature. The following are verbatim 
statements from the participants: 
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“… they're skinning cables and they put it in the bottle” - P17 (Contractor). 
“They put cables and then put it through inside the containers” - P5 (SO). 
“… they're skimming the cables, put them in their bags so that, when they 
go out … they put it maybe in the container, the lunch containers, so that, 
when you go out, you will have thought that they have their leftovers then 
they put them inside those containers” - P1 (SO). 
“… the cables cut into pieces, wherever they put it in the bags, they are 
using to go to work, which one wrapped up with a glove” - P3 (Security 
Officer). 
“… they put those pieces inside the two litre of cold drink” - P11 
(Intelligence), crime intelligence related information. 
“… the criminal, they skin, the cable, and they are putting the two litre of 
drink” - P2 (Investigator), crime investigation related information. 
“… cables are skinned and put it inside the bags” - P4 (SO),  
“… the theft of copper; they just take it and they put it into two piece 
plastic aside wires aside, they tied to their body and they put another 
jacket on top” - P16 (Technology). 
The participants revealed that copper cables are cut and put in portable containers 
so that they could be easily hidden. These employees intend to sabotage the 
employer (contractor) to ensure that their employers suffer as a result of their 
actions.  
(b) Cables are stolen from inside and thrown over the fence 
In this study, the participants reported that thieves often throw stolen cables over the 
perimeter fence surrounding Medupi Power Station. The following statements 
confirm this: 
 “They took the cables and scaling up the fence when they were on strike. 
They burnt vehicles and damaged buildings” - P9 (SO). 
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“… you can say, because people, they're stealing cable or they're skinning 
cables, yes. Or to the skin cube, will they put it in the bottle” - P5 (SO). 
“Most people waiting inside; you break them into small pieces so that they 
are portable enough for them to smuggle out of sight without being 
noticed” - P1 (SO). 
“… they just cut them into small pieces and smuggle them out” - P17 
(Contractor). 
“… [they cut] copper cable into pieces, and throwing them in there” - P16 
(Technology). 
“… there were pieces of cable being cut on every day because every time 
it was cut or not marked” - P11 (Intelligence). 
The reason for that is because they will either collect it after hours during the night or 
have people who will collect it on their behalf. According to Narayan (2013:11), 
copper cable theft occurs during the construction of the power utility and again when 
the utility is operational.  
(c) Cables are put inside the bonnet of a vehicle 
The participants in this study confirmed that thieves smuggled stolen copper cable 
by hiding it under the bonnet of a vehicle. This was revealed by participants 11, 18 
and 13 when they said that: 
“And things could be easily placed inside the bonnets and taken out” -P11 
(Intelligence). 
“… they just put it maybe inside the bags or at the front of the bonnet and 
then to get outside” - P18 (SO). 
“… when they put it in the bonnet, they are aware it is the place for the 
engine and some of them do not switch off the engine during search” - 
P13 (SO). 
This is a new modus operandi which is not supported by the literature.  
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(d) Cables are put under the seat of a bus 
Participants confirmed that stolen goods are smuggled under the seats of buses. 
This is confirmed by the following statements: 
“Some, they're putting them on the seats of the bus” - P7 (SO).  
“And other people … they put it under behind the seat” - P16 
(Technology). 
“So normally, they put cables on that transport on the one that transport 
tissue only he didn't place his luck buses” - P5 (SO). 
“… when we do searching, we found them in the car, under the seats, 
hiding under the seats, cutting cables at the plant” - P18 (SO). 
(e) Cut fence to get access into premises to commit other crimes 
Another modus operandi for committing crime at Medupi Power Station is by cutting 
the fence to gain access to the power station. This is a new finding which is not 
supported by the existing literature review. It also demonstrates a gap in the 
literature. Participants had this to say: 
“… cutting the defence in order to gain access in order to steal the cable 
or the material or the vehicle and stuff like that” - P2 (Investigator). 
“… they are cutting fences, taking them outside by cutting fences, some 
are coming out with them at the gateway by taking chances for not being 
searched by the security” - P17 (Contractor). 
“… the copper cables during the night or in the place where they usually 
cut the cable which one cannot throw so can number two housekeeping 
happen in your area usually containers where no visible security” - P9 
(SO). 
“… used to cut out earlier or to cut our fence to get inside our premises for 
the housebreaking” - P14 (SO). 




(f) Wrap stolen cables around the body 
Some of the thieves wrap the stolen copper around their body parts, such as on the 
legs or the body which is covered by clothes. This type of modus operandi lacks 
support from the literature which renders it to be a new theme that emerged from the 
findings of this study.  The following are some of the responses from the participants: 
“… for that for cables, sometimes they skinny the skinny those cables and 
they sometimes roll them on the upper bodies or put them in the dustbin 
or put them in the bottles, the plastic bottles and bottles” - P2 
(Investigator). 
“They are hidden on their body” - P9 (SO). 
“They do that. Some of them are wrapping it on their legs” - P18 (SO). 
In order to determine from the participants the key types of security threats and 
vulnerabilities that occur at Medupi, they were asked about how crime can be 
reduced at the site.
(g) The manner in which crime is reduced at the site 
The main purpose of this question was to explore the participants’ experiences on 
how crime can be reduced at the site. The participants indicated that they use a 
variety of measures to reduce crime from happening at the site that included patrols 
and conducting searches on vehicles and persons. The use of CCTV cameras is 
regarded as a proactive approach to policing due to the fact that criminals can be 
identified leading to arrests (Moyo, 2019:9). Cebekhulu (2016:42) contends that 
CCTV cameras are deterrences and that an opportunist criminal is intimidated by a 
noticeable camera.  The literature indicates that CCTV surveillance cameras, access 
control measures and biometrics are the measures used to reduce crime (Moyo, 
2019; Cebekhulu, 2016).  
(h) Patrols  
The participants indicated that conducting foot and vehicle patrols by armed security 
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officers contributes to the reduction of crime on the site (City of Tshwane, 2016:2). 
The following are direct quotes from the participants: 
“… Another thing is patrol. Regular patrol at the night must be conducted” 
- P7 (SO).   
“… that I patrol the premises NKP fence” - P9 (SO). 
“… make sure that we use our vehicle to patrol the premises” - P17 
(Contractor). 
“… the patrol can be for an hour or after one hour 30 minutes to check if 
our set is in good condition” - P10 (SO). 
“… we conduct regular patrols to ensure that you keep the site when they 
win when such a person has got the knowledge” - P4 (SO). 
(i) Conduct searches 
Searches are one of the measures that are in place to reduce crime at the site. 
Participants indicated that they search vehicles and persons to ensure that they are 
not leaving or entering the premises with stolen items. The following are the verbatim 
statements from the participants: 
“We searching everyone entering the site” - P2 (Investigator). 
“… access control – I'm searching people because everyone entering and 
leaving the site making sure that every equipment in the site authorised to 
leave the site so that any devices that you're using to search those 
vehicles” - P6 (Senior Manager), security management related 
information. 
“Body searches done at the exit points at the security point” - P9 (SO). 
It is evident from the participants that conducting searches when people enter and 
leave the premises can be an effective tool in reducing crime at the site.  
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(j) CCTV surveillance cameras 
The participants view CCTV surveillance cameras as another measure to reduce 
crime. Some findings, for example, Moyo (2019:60), confirm that CCTV systems are 
used as a security tool to enhance the level of protection and the assets against 
security risks. Security officers are able to detect an intrusion in progress through the 
CCTV surveillance cameras (Cebekhulu, 2016:42). Gibson (2017:22) indicates that 
one or more CCTV cameras are deployed at the same time. They are of the view 
that CCTV cameras can reduce crime because they are available during the day and 
night. Participants explained: 
“… the security measures that I can see to fit, is for having CCTV camera” 
- P2 (Investigator). 
“… we are using good quality CCTV” - P15 (SO). 
“CCTV security room monitors or discovers any wrongdoing or illegal 
irregularity” - P12 (SO). 
According to the participant’s responses, CCTV surveillance cameras play a pivotal 
role in combating crime.  
(k) Using access control measures 
According to the participants, access control measures play a role in reducing crime. 
This includes the use of biometrics and searches of persons and vehicles entering 
and leaving the premises. There is evidence in the literature about the role of access 
control, for example, Musonza (2016:55) points out that access control facilitates the 
movement of people, vehicles and goods in and out of the premises. Access control 
measures are achieved using a number of measures that include security guards, 
locks and biometrics (Borham, Abas, Azizan & Syariff, 2016:3). The following are the 
verbatim statements from the participants:  
“When we do access control” - P6 (Senior Manager).  
“… we observe the vehicles inside and we check all those hidden areas. 
Those are the methods we're using, especially on the entrance or the 
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access control” - P5 (SO). 
“… to reduce crimes on the site is to make sure that we are doing access 
control basically in those vehicles and passes when they enter the site 
mostly” - P15 (SO). 
Access control restricts access and thus can reduce crime (Bowers et al, 2004; 
Donnelly & Kimble, 1997; Johnson & Bowers, 2010). “Access control is the way by 
which people are approved or refused admission to controlled areas, such as office 
suites, storage amenities or car parks” (Integrated Solutions, 2009:62). 
4.3.1.2 What types of security threats and vulnerabilities occur at 
Medupi? 
Theme 3: Identification of security threats and vulnerabilities  
The following categories were identified under this theme:  
The participants were of the view that there were many security threats and 
vulnerabilities at Medupi. They also indicated that threats are caused by the 
following: 
(a) More than one gate and a lack of resources including manpower 
The participants were concerned about multiple gates in the premises while there is 
a shortage of resources and manpower to perform duties at these gates. Pretorius 
(2012:170) established that having security manpower was not sufficient to 
effectively mitigate copper cable theft as they lacked security experience and 
knowledge. The participants who were concerned about multiple gates indicated: 
“The threats that I see here are a lot of gates … lots of gates that are 
entering” - P18 (SO). 
“… we've got a lot of gates around the side” - P1 (SO). 
“… most of the gate or several of the gates …” - P10 (SO). 
Some of the participants were concerned about the lack of manpower. They 
maintained that there were not sufficient security officers to man the gates and this 
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compromises the security of the station. They said that: 
“… sometimes you will find out that you don't have enough manpower on 
some of the gates” - P14 (SO). 
“Manpower is limited” P17 (Contractor). 
“… normally we always work with a short shift. Not full with manpower” - 
P8 (Senior Security Inspector). 
“… not working with full manpower” - P2 (Investigator). 
“… we need to get more manpower within this unit to get people to be on 
[duty]” - P5 (SO). 
It is evident from the above responses that insufficient manpower has an effect on 
the commission of crime in the premises. According to the participants, a lack of 
resources meant that they were not fulfilling the tasks as anticipated. Some of the 
participants said: 
 “To be honest, in terms of combating crime, we don't have resources” 
P13 (Security Officer). 
“… we don't have any resources up to so far” - P16 (Technology). 
“… we do not have resources” - P18 (Senior Inspector). 
“… we don't have enough resources to combat crime” - P4 (SO). 
It is clear from the participants that it is not practically possible to reduce security 
threats and vulnerability at these gates without sufficient manpower and the 
availability of the necessary resources.  
(b) Employee negligence on security related issues 
The participants were of the view that one of the security threats at Medupi is 
employee negligence. Employee negligence is not supported by literature therefore it 




“… they're mostly getting stolen as a result of negligence from the site” P7 
(Security Officer). 
“… as well as negligence …” - P11 (Intelligence). 
“The other issue is of negligence and ignorance on security issues” - P12 
(SO). 
It is clear from the participants that employees, including contract workers, are 
negligent about security threats and vulnerabilities.  
(c) Sharing of computer passwords 
A concern regarding theft of information is caused by people who share passwords. 
The sharing of computer passwords is not supported by literature.  Some of the 
participants indicated: 
“So if I want to, I want to get your password, I can see. I know some of the 
passwords are like that” - P15 (SO). 
“… stolen credentials, as stolen passwords, are the simplest and most 
common causes of data breaches and criminals and hackers might gain 
access to sensitive information …” - P8 (Senior Inspector). 
“This is a serious concern, because people can get information that they 
should not have; they access computer as they share passwords” - P1 
(SO). 
The participants felt that unauthorised access to sensitive information is a major 
threat to Medupi. People share passwords while some hack the system to get 
access to information. 
(d) Cutting of the fence 
According to the participants, criminals gain access into the premises by cutting the 
fence. This theme is not supported by literature and therefore relies on evidence 




“… and people who are cutting fence to access the NKP” - P14 (SO). 
“… they are cutting the fence in order to gain access in order to steal the 
cable or the material or the vehicle and stuff like that” - P9 (SO). 
“… the people are cutting the fences and get into the site” - P16 
(Technology). 
The participants felt that the type of fence and the manner in which it is constructed 
does not deter criminals from accessing the premises.  
4.3.1.3 What are the security measures at Medupi? 
According to the participants, the following are the security measures that exist at 
Medupi: 
Theme 4:  Types of security measures 
(a) Boom-gate 
The participants indicated that there are boom-gates at some of the entrances to the 
premises. A boom gate system is an automated vehicle access at the access control 
point. It is a gate that automatically opens for a specific period of time and then 
closes (Enokela & Tyowuah, 2014:86). Some of the participants indicated: 
“… all entrances have boom-gates …” - P8 (Senior Inspector). 
“… boom-gates are used for access control” - P16 (Technology). 
“If boom-gates are effective, they facilitate smooth access control to the 
site” - P5 (SO). 
“Boom-gates allow for simple access to Medupi” - P18 (SO). 
According to these participants, access to the premises is controlled by the use of 
boom-gates. Prior to using the boom gate, a person driving a vehicle must satisfy the 
security officers at the gate to qualify for such entrance. Only then is access granted.  
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(b) Security officers 
One of the security measures in Medupi is security officers. The role of security 
officers is to conduct patrols to ensure that everything is in order and report the 
findings to the occurrence book (OB). Security officers play a fundamental role in 
reducing crime and increasing detection (Ariel, Bland & Sutherland, 2017:3). Some 
of the participants said that: 
“… security officers are deployed …” - P10 (Security Officer). 
“… security officers patrol the area and report the incidents to the 
supervisor” - P1 (SO). 
“… the role of security officer is to ensure high visibility on entry points by 
conducting search and screening of personnel” - P8 (Senior Inspector). 
“… security officers must also escort individuals that gained access to 
vulnerable assets …” - P16 (Technology). 
According to the participants, security officers are one of the security measures 
employed to reduce threats and vulnerabilities within the premises of Medupi Power 
Station. 
(c) CCTV surveillance cameras 
CCTV surveillance cameras were indicated as one of the security measures to 
reduce threats and vulnerabilities at the premises. CCTV cameras enable the 
operators to observe suspicious behaviour, people, vehicle and objects 
(Mahambane, 2017:50). CCTV improves the rate of arrest and ensures successful 
prosecution of offenders by facilitating the effective deployment of security officers 
and the gathering of evidence (Moyo, 2019:63). The participants indicated that: 
“… we are using the CCTV camera to monitor” - P4 (SO). 
“… we also use CCTV …” - P18 (SO). 
“… by monitoring a CCTV camera …” - P11 (Intelligence). 
The participants were vocal about the fact that they use CCTV cameras to reduce 
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threats and vulnerabilities at the premises.  
(d)Turnstile as part of access control measure 
The participants indicated that, at the access control point, they use turnstiles as one 
of the security measures used to reduce threats and vulnerabilities at the premises. 
According to Mahambane (2017:4), access control is the means by which people are 
granted or denied access to restricted areas. This means that unauthorised people 
do not have access into the premises (Borham et al, 2016:4). Some of the responses 
from the participants are that: 
“… turnstiles which people are using when entering and leaving the site 
…” - P6 (Senior Manager). 
“… we use a turnstile to control our employees” - P12 (SO). 
“… we have a turnstile whereby access control …” - P3 (SO). 
It is evident from the participants that they use turnstiles at the premises to reduce 
threats and vulnerabilities.  
(e) Access cards 
The use of access cards to control access into the premises was mentioned. The 
following are some of the responses from the participants: 
“… the access control, with access card …” - P7 (SO). 
“… access card that is being issued by the security upon such person’s 
production of an ID or passport …” - P14 (SO). 
“… the use of an access card …” - P18 (SO). 
It is clear from the participant’s responses that the access card is used to control 
access into the premises.  
(f) Electric fence 
The participants indicated that an electric fence is used to prevent unauthorised 
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entry into the premises. The use of electric fences can serve as a preventive 
measure (Cavalcanti, Grawshaw & Tortato, 2012:299). The following are some of the 
responses from the participants: 
“The electric fence that is preventing the intrusion into this to come on 
site” - P6 (Senior Manager). 
“… we having electric fences looking at those measures …” - P11 
(Intelligence). 
“We use electric fences as well” - P15 (SO). 
The participants are of the view that electric fences are used to reduce threats and 
vulnerabilities.  
(g) Biometrics 
According to Sabhanayagam, Ventatesan and Senthamaraikannan (2018:2276), 
biometric refers “to certain physiological or behavioural characteristics that are 
uniquely associated with a person. For example, face, iris, fingerprint, retina, hand 
geometry and DNA biometrics. The participants mentioned that they also have 
biometric systems at the gate to control access into the premises. Biometric security 
measures reduce the opportunities for the commission of crimes (Ariel et al, 2017:1). 
According to Edure and Adio (2018:2), biometrics are used in different applications 
to prevent unauthorised access to the use of private information such as ATMs, 
smart cards, computer networks and desktop PCs, etc. The following are the 
participant’s views on this: 
“We have a biometric system in place” - P8 (Senior Inspector). 
“… and also have the biometric machines at the gate” - P17 (Contractor). 
“… also biometric …” - P5 (SO). 




(h) Metal detectors 
According to the participants, security officers use metal detectors as one of the 
access control measures. Some of the participants said: 
“We are using metal detectors for checking” - P1 (SO). 
“Metal detector is the one that we can use at the gate” - P9 (SO). 
“Metal detector is the one that you scan when the person is entering the 
site” - P10 (SO). 
It is clear from the participants that metal detectors are one of the security measures 
that they are using for access control. 
4.3.1.4 How can power station security officers combat criminal 
activities at Medupi? 
Theme 5: The security officers’ role in combating crime 
The following categories were identified under this theme: 
(a) Conduct regular patrols and attend incidents 
According to the participants, combating crime includes conducting regular foot and 
vehicle patrols and attending to security threat incidents. Some of the participants 
indicated: 
“We are always doing patrols around the area” - P14 (SO). 
“Sometimes we attend crime incidents that have happened” - P3 (SO. 
“Every time, we are patrolling” - P18 (SO). 
It is clear from the participants that security officers conduct patrols on foot and also 
in vehicles within the premises. 
(b) Strengthen access control measures 
An access control point authenticates entry and exit into the facility (Musonza, 
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2016:56). The participants indicated that they strengthen access control by ensuring 
that everyone and all the vehicles entering the site are subjected to searches. The 
responses from the participants indicate states that: 
“We do access control most of the time” - P11 (Intelligence). 
“Although we have other measures, we also do searches” - P9 (SO). 
“It is important to search all the employees entering, if we can” - P7 (SO). 
It is clear from the participants that access control measures need to be 
strengthened by searching all the peoples and vehicles entering the site. 
(c) Dishonest security officers 
The participants stated that some of the security officers were not honest. In a study 
conducted by Nkwana (2015:115), it was established that the probability of internal 
staff getting an opportunity to commit theft was found to be high due to a lack of 
security control measures. Some of the participants said: 
“You cannot trust some of the security guards” - P2 (Investigator). 
“They connive with the contract workers to steal cables from the site” - P6 
(Senior Manager). 
“One security officer was found stealing without wearing a uniform and 
disguised as a contract worker” - P8 (Senior Inspector). 
According to the participants, some of the security officers were regarded as 
dishonest employees as they were involved in criminal activities when they had a 
legal duty to protect and serve. 
(d) Enforcing compliance with site rules 
Combating crime onsite is important because all employees must be compliant with 
the rules and regulations governing the site.  Some of the participants indicated that: 
“… the employees that are going around within the site ensure that 
employees are complying with the site rules” - P1 (SO). 
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“Officers should ensure that all employees and contractors comply with 
the rules onsite” - P5 (SO). 
“… officers to ensure that people want to come, they need to comply at all 
times” - P13 (SO). 
“Compliance also includes compliance with the Occupational Health and 
Safety Act of the government” - P16 (Technology). 
According to the participants, security officers ensure that anyone entering the site 
should comply with the regulations. 
(e) Inability to deal with suspects that are armed 
The participants indicated that one of the challenges of their duties is that they were 
not able to deal with armed suspects since they were not armed. This theme was not 
supported by literature. Some of the participants indicated that: 
“…our guys that are under threat or they've been attacked because they 
don't have resources” - P9 (SO). 
“You cannot approach armed suspects empty handed” - P14 (SO). 
“This puts our lives in danger because we are not armed” - P10 (SO). 
According to the participants, it is difficult to arrest an armed suspect due to the fact 
that security officers are not armed. This poses a serious threat to the lives of the 
security officers and also puts the assets of the Medupi in serious danger. 
 Theme 6: Participants’ experiences of combating crime 
This theme identifies the participants’ understanding of their role in combating crime. 
The following categories emanated from this theme: 
(a) Ensure that all equipment and personnel are protected on site 
The participants indicated that their role is to ensure the protection of all the people 
and assets on site. Some of the participants indicated: 
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“What I want to see that everything here should be protected” - P8 (Senior 
Inspector). 
“There is a need for the protection of all assets and all the people” –P17 
(Contractor). 
“All the people and assets have to be protected by security officers” - P1 
(SO). 
According to the participants, protection of all the assets and people on site is 
required. 
(b) Sharing information with the police 
The participants indicated that all crime related information is shared with the police 
so that they can conduct investigations and effect arrests. This theme is not 
supported by literature. It is clear that there is dearth of literature on this theme. 
Some of the participants indicated: 
“When there is something that requires the police, we call them” - P6 
(Senior Manager). 
“It is important to work with the police when crime occurs” - P10 (SO). 
“The police come here to arrest those that are committing crimes” - P18 
(SO). 
According to the participants, it is necessary to liaise with the police when crime 
takes place on site. 
(c) Foot and vehicle patrol 
The participants indicated that they conduct patrols using vehicle and also foot 
patrol. Some of the participants indicated: 
“We also do the patrols” - P4 (SO). 
“… we mentioned the issue of the vehicle patrols” - P7 (SO). 
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“During the day, we do foot patrol, and during the night, we do vehicle 
patrol” - P11 (Intelligence). 
It is clear to those participants that they are conducting vehicle and foot patrols on 
the site. 
(d) Encourage team work among members 
The participants indicated that they encouraged their security officers to work in 
teams to support each another. Some of the participants indicated: 
“What is important is to motivate employees is to work as a team” - P5 
(SO). 
“Working as a team is very important” - P8 (Senior Inspector).  
“It is important that employees are encouraged to work in teams” - P16 
(Technology). 
It is clear from the participants that security functions require security officers to work 
in teams to ensure successful functioning. 
(e) Conduct searches when entering and leaving the site 
The participants indicated that they conduct searches when employees enter and 
leave the premises. This is done in order to ensure that no dangerous items enter 
and employer properties do not leave the premises. Some of the participants 
indicated: 
“… all employees entering the site are properly searched” - P3 (SO). 
“We also check to ensure that no one leaves with the employer's property” 
- P9 (SO). 
“Searching employees is important in ensuring the protection of the 
employer’s assets” - P14 (SO). 
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(f) Tool verification when exit the site 
The participants indicated that, in order to prevent crime in the premises, it is 
important to ensure that tools entering and leaving the site are verified to check if 
they are stolen or dangerous. Tools are assets and thus every asset has to be 
verified for its authenticity and also to determine if it is possessed by an authorised 
person. The participants indicated: 
“Tools must be verified if they are not stolen from the site” - P1 (SO). 
“It is necessary to verify the tools that employees are found to be in 
possession with” - P5 (SO). 
“… and also verify the tools in possession of any person” - P17 
(Contractor). 
It is clear from the participants that all tools must be verified. 
(g) Prevent any threat to the safety of people and assets 
The other role that the participants play is to ensure that all threats to the safety of 
the assets and people on site are prevented. Physical security threats may come 
from the internal staff, such as security officers, contractors and trusted employees 
(Borham et al, 2016:4) as some of the participants indicated: 
“… it is to ensure that all the people are working on an environment free 
from threat” - P16 (Technology). 
“Threats should be eliminated at all costs” - P7 (SO). 
“We have to remove all the threats and potential dangers to ensure the 
safety of the people and assets” - P12 (SO). 
It is clear from the participants that anything that poses a threat to the safety of the 
people and assets should be eliminated. 
(h) Enhance compliance with policies, procedures and directives 
The participants indicated that they played the role of ensuring that the employees 
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on site comply with policies, procedures and security directives. Some of the 
participants indicated: 
“People must comply with the law all the time” - P2 (Investigator). 
“It is necessary for compliance here” - P6 (Senior Manager). 
“Compliance to the law and rules is important to adhere to” - P9 (SO). 
The above participants indicated that they ensured that all the employees were 
adhering to the rules and regulations, as well as the legislative framework. 
(i) Ensure alarms are functional 
The participants ensure that all the alarms on site are functional. This includes 
reporting to the management and ensuring that they are properly fixed. Some of the 
participants indicated: 
“All the alarms are working” - P3 (SO). 
“The alarms are always problematic, but must make sure that they are 
working” - P8 (Senior Inspector). 
“We must ensure that alarms are in good conditions all the time” - P17 
(Contractor). 
It is clear from the participants that the alarms are effective at all times. 
(j) Doors closed and locked 
According to the participants, they ensure that all the doors are closed and locked 
after hours. It is clear from the evidence that doors must be kept locked when there 
is nobody in the space. Some of the participants said: 
“When we patrol, we must close all doors that are left open” - P1 (SO). 
“Close all the doors” - P5 (SO). 
“All doors must be closed” - P10 (SO). 
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The participants indicated that all the doors that are left open are closed by the 
security officers during patrol. 
(k) Educate visitors on the violation of access control procedures 
The participants indicated that they ensure that all employees and visitors are 
educated on access control procedures at the access control point.  Some of the 
participants indicated that: 
“All visitors must be educated about the access control” - P7 (SO). 
“… anyone entering must be informed of the procedures” - P12 (SO). 
“Educating them about access control is important” - P18 (SO).   
It is clear from the participants that one of their roles is to ensure that visitors are 
educated about access control measures.  
Theme 7: Methods or strategies to combat crime 
The following categories were identified for this theme: 
(a) Encourage healthy work relationships 
According to the participants, in order to combat crime, they encourage their 
subordinates to perform better by having healthy working relationships. This includes 
open communication regarding work and home situations that may impact negatively 
on their performance. Some of the responses from the participants were: 
“… we are working having a very close relationship with …” - P2 
(Investigator). 
“… and close relationship and report suspicious activities for relevant 
authority …” - P9 (SO). 
“… We have a very good relationship [so] that we communicate on a 
regular basis and show each other the importance of keeping the 
information …” - P11 (Intelligence). 
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The participants indicated that they motivate their employees to perform their tasks. 
(b) Encourage reporting of suspicious activities 
The participants were of the view that they encourage their subordinates to report 
suspicious activities to combat crime. Some of the participants said that: 
“… to encourage them all the time to encourage them to report” - P9 (SO). 
“… inform and encourage employees to report any suspicious activities” -
P15 (SO). 
“… and then my role is to encourage my team. Let's search people when 
they are entered on site and then when they leave site … we verify tools 
that they have to try to produce their claim … one can try to commit on our 
side” - P1 (SO). 
(c) Monitor movements and details of people and vehicles entry onsite 
According to the participants, their role is to ensure that all the movements of the 
people and vehicles are closely monitored while in the premises. Some of the 
participants said that: 
“… monitoring the movements and details of people and vehicles and also 
taking note of the vehicle make and the registration as well as personnel 
closing” - P7 (SO). 
“Check the warehouses; check the movement of the person inside” - P18 
(SO). 
“If there was any movement, we have to know immediately” - P10 (SO). 
It is evident that the participants ensure that they keep records of the movement of 
vehicles and people on site. 
(d) Using personnel identification cards 
The participants indicated that they were using access cards for access control. 
Some of the responses were: 
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“… information by verifying the access card …” - P4 (SO). 
“I must ask the access card for the person who look for a key to check 
and record the relevant information on the register” - P14 (SO). 
“… people used to place the card on the machine and gain access”  - P8 
(Senior Inspector). 
“… access card ensures that anybody without card means that person 
must not be allowed on site”  - P3 (SO). 
(e) CCTV surveillance cameras 
The participants revealed that they use CCTV surveillance cameras in addition to the 
police to combat personal and property crimes on site (Moyo, 2019:74). According to 
Johnsen and Stene (2016:305), CCTV cameras can be used as a proactive control 
tool to deter incidents of crime and also to learn by finding and analysing a situation 
after it has taken place. Some of the participants indicated that: 
“… effective entity such as this, we have reliable surveillance cameras at 
all times” - P15 (SO). 
“… we are having CCTV camera in the control room”  - P16 (Technology). 
“And we also have monitoring for our CCTV cameras by security control 
office” - P6 (Senior Manager). 
“… efficient CCTV cameras are in place in and around Medupi”  - P11 
(Intelligence). 
“… we use the monitoring CCTV cameras”  - P13 (SO). 
According to the participants, CCTV is one of the security measures that they use to 
combat crime on site. 
(f) Patrols 




“Regular patrol at the night is conducted” - P8 (Senior Inspector). 
“… almost make sure that I patrol the premises” - P12 (SO). 
“… make sure that we use our vehicle to patrol the premises” - P15 (SO). 
“We also have to conduct patrol at the fence” - P2 (Investigator). 
“… conducting patrols at the crime hotspots” - P9 (SO). 
The participants indicated that they patrol the area using vehicles. They also conduct 
patrols at crime hotpots. The purpose of patrols is to identify anomalies occurring in 
the premises and to ensure that those responsible are held to account.  
(g) The use of metal detectors 
The participants indicated that they used metal detectors for access control. Some of 
the participants said that: 
“… metal detector, we use to scan when the person is entering the site” 
P7 (SO). 
“Metal detector is the one that we can use it the gate” - P13 (SO). 
“… we're using, detectors, metal detectors for checking all those stolen 
cables, we were using” - P5 (SO). 
“Those are the reasons you're using metal detectors” - P1 (SO). 
According to the participants, metal detectors at the access control play a role in 
combating crime before it enters the site. 
Theme 8: Resources required to combat crime 
The purpose of this question was to explore the type of resources that the 
participants need to reduce threats and vulnerabilities in the Medupi Power Station. 
The following are the sub-themes under this theme: 
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(a) CCTV surveillance cameras 
According to the participants, they require resources, such as CCTV cameras that 
are functional at all times, to be able to do their jobs. CCTV cameras are targeted at 
places where there are entrance and exit doors (Moyo, 2019:66). The role of CCTV 
cameras is to provide evidence that can be used during investigations of crime 
(Ashby, 2017:4). They also protect members of the public from harm (Kurdi, 
2014:199). Some of the participants said that: 
“… those cameras … that can view anything that can cause harm to the 
… post issue, should be effective, monitored and fixed” - P18 (SO). 
“The cameras must always be on. And then it must be someone on the 
camera room monitoring people” - P2 (SO). 
“CCTV cameras are needed to play a role in here” - P8 (Senior Inspector). 
It is evident from the participants that they need effective CCTV cameras that are 
functional. Cameras need to be properly maintained in order to be functional at all 
times. 
(b) Security alarm systems 
The term security is defined by Borham et al (2016:2) as “the quality or state of being 
secure which means to be free from danger”. The participants indicated that they 
must have alarm systems to send a signal so that they are able to respond. Some of 
the participants said that: 
“If we can have alarms, the better” - P11 (Intelligence). 
“We should get alarm systems to be installed and people should be able 
to respond to it immediately” - P6 (Senior Manager). 
“You see, alarms are good, to have it can assist us a lot” - P5 (SO). 
(c) Locking systems for doors and windows 
The participants were of the view that there must be effective locking systems for 
both the windows and doors to prevent intruders. Some of the participants said: 
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“… so that we will lock the doors and windows to prevent people entering 
the warehouse to steal” - P10 (SO). 
“… and locked with it; maybe with lock all the doors in our warehouse 
area” - P17 (Contractor). 
“… upgrading the locks on doors, windows and outbuildings” - P7 (SO). 
According to the responses from the participants, there it was necessary for the 
protection of assets by upgrading the locking system. The most inexpensive door 
locks are easily breached by anyone with knowledge of its weaknesses (Henage & 
Henage, 2013:84). 
(d) Two-way radio communication 
The participants indicated that it is important to have two-way radios to enhance their 
communication about problems related to threats and vulnerabilities. They indicated 
that: 
“… the two-way radio is an essential means for communication” - P1 
(SO). 
“Having radio communication is important to communicate about crime” - 
P8 (Senior Inspector). 
“Through two-way radio, we able to respond to the crime incident quicker” 
- P16 (Technology). 
According to the responses of the participants, two-way radio communication is 
necessary for the security officers to communicate. It is important that all security 
officers must be equipped with two-way radios to communicate amongst each other 
(Visser, 2015:54). 
(e) Flashlight torches 
The participants voiced the value of having flashlight torches. Some of the 
participant’s responses were: 
“… and then others are torches to check during the night” - P5 (SO). 
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“During the night we are struggling, we are even afraid of patrolling 
because we do not have torches” - P13 (SO). 
“If we can have torches, [we] will be able to patrol much easier rather than 
to put our lives in danger during the night” - P9 (SO). 
(f) Digital cameras to use during patrol 
“I think it is important if we can get digital cameras to record all the 
incidents at that particular time, maybe can serve as evidence” - P3 (SO). 
“The use of digital cameras will make our work a lot easier” - P8 (Senior 
Inspector). 
“And the digital camera is essential during patrols where CCTV cameras 
are not installed” - P4 (SO). 
It is clear from the participants that it is important to have digital cameras that they 
can use during patrols to record the events that they observe. 
(g) Pocket book 
The participants indicated that they should be given pocket books to record events 
when conducting patrols. The following are verbatim statements from the 
participants: 
“… as well as having a pen and a pocket book to provide reports, 
observations and incidents or get on site in during our patrol” - P7 (SO). 
“It is necessary for the officers to be equipped with pocket books so that it 
corresponds with OB” - P6 (Senior Manager). 
“Pocket books can be used to record anything that the security officers 
observe during patrol within the premises” - P11 (Intelligence). 
(h) Night vision cameras 
The participants indicated that they require night vision cameras to be able to 
capture events in the dark. Some of the participants indicated that: 
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“… because a few have a night vision camera, you can see on the people 
who are trying to enter …” - P10 (SO). 
“And the night vision camera will normally be used, especially in the bush, 
where we do patrols around the dam …” - P16 (Technology). 
“There are a lot of trees, there are a lot of elements that site or tents or 
people can try to hunt those animals at night. So we monitor that through 
the night vision camera to reduce people who are hunting” - P18 (SO). 
According to the participants, the use of night-vision cameras can be helpful for them 
when they do patrol during the night especially in places where there are no 
cameras, such as the dam.  
(i) Firearms and bullet proofs vests 
The participants indicated that firearms and bullet proof vests are necessary in order 
to protect themselves against armed suspects. Copper cable thieves are careful 
about their planning and also carry firearms, which requires security officers to be 
armed (City of Tshwane, 2016:2). Some of the participants indicated that: 
“And bullet proofs are required so we wear them at all times” - P17 
(Contractor). 
“… then the bullet proofs are important for use as security officers” - P14 
(SO). 
“If we can have bullet proofs, we can save our lives from criminals who 
are armed” - P5 (SO). 
“They should at least give us firearm” - P13 (SO). 
“We  must be provided with firearms to protect ourselves from the thugs” - 
P10 (SO). 
The participants were of the view that the firearms and bullet proof vests protect 
them against armed criminals. 
Theme 9: The challenges experienced when combating crime 
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The participants indicated that they experienced many challenges when combating 
crime that include: employee negligence, leaving valuable items, such as laptops, 
unattended; warehouses and offices left open; fences that are cut to gain access into 
the premises and community members who collect firewood in the premises. 
Another challenge is that security officers do not have sufficient resources to enable 
them to perform security functions that include patrolling dark areas during the night 
without torches. The participants reported that requests for resources are ignored by 
the management. There is also lack of cooperation between employees, security and 
contract workers. Some of the responses from the participants said that: 
“Some employees do not care about us when doing our duties” - P12 
(SO). 
“Sometimes when we conduct patrol, we found warehouse left open and 
valuable resources not attended or kept in a safe place” - P6 (Senior 
Manager). 
“The suspects were arrested for cutting the fence when they want to enter 
the premises with the intention to commit crime” - P11 (Intelligence). 
“What makes things worse is that we don’t have the necessary resources 
to perform our functions as security officers” - P8 (Senior Inspector). 
It is clear from the participants that there are many challenges when performing 
security functions.  
(a) Suggestions for best practices to combat crime 
The participants suggested that more security officers were required to improve 
security on site and that a contactor must be appointed to maintain surveillance 
cameras. The participants felt that the best practice is to enforce the law when 
performing security functions. It is important for the management to reprimand 
employees who come to work while under the influence of alcohol and drugs. It is 
necessary to ensure that the participants are provided with sufficient resources, such 
as firearms, pocket books, bullet proof vests, etc. Anyone involved in criminal 
activities within the premises should be arrested and handed over to the police. 
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Some of the participants indicated that: 
“Security officers should be enough to be able to perform security duties 
during the day and the night” - P1 (SO). 
“Management must be at the forefront of security, they must have buy-in 
into the security issues” - P7 (SO). 
“No, the problem is management, people must not come to work drunk, 
no, is not allowed” - P13 (SO). 
“These people are not considerate of the security and their duties” - P11 
(Intelligence). 
“We cannot allow criminal activities; we should be able to arrest everyone 
involved in crime” - P10 (SO). 
The participants suggested that security patrols should be conducted three times 
during the day and three times during the night. It was also suggested that 
management should be on board regarding security issues. The participants also 
suggested that steps should be taken against those who report for duty while under 
the influence of alcohol or drugs. 
4.3.1.5 What are the causes of the security threats and vulnerabilities to 
the power station? 
The purpose of this question was to explore the participants’ views on the causes of 
security threats and vulnerabilities.  
Theme 10: The causes of security threats and vulnerabilities to the power 
station 
The participants believed that there were many causes of security threats and 
vulnerabilities faced at the Medupi that included: 
(a) Unauthorised employee absenteeism 
Unauthorised absenteeism takes place when an employee is absent without prior 
permission from the employer (Singh, Chetty & Karodia, 2016:107). Some of the 
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participants indicated that unauthorised employee absenteeism is rife at the site on 
weekends and month ends: 
“… absenteeism is at highest on weekends, and month end” - P12 (SO). 
“Employees are not showing up when they got paid” - P17 (Contractor). 
“They are always not coming to work when they are supposed to” - P3 
(SO). 
According to the participants, employee absenteeism is a serious concern because it 
affects production of the power station.  
(b) Employee negligence on security related issues 
The participants were believed that employee negligence is among the causes of 
threats and vulnerabilities as it results in the theft of equipment. Some of the 
participants said: 
“The other issue is of negligence and ignorance of present” 
P11(Intelligence). 
“Employee negligence is a serious problem here” - P6 (Senior Manager). 
“They are not serious, this is negligent” - P2 (Investigator). 
“… stubborn employees questioning the authority of officers were 
performing duties on the ground” - P18 (SO). 
“… they are leaving those appliances lying around” - P12 (SO). 
“They're just leaving their tools” - P6 (Senior Manager). 
“… they're not taking care of those appliances; they are leaving those 
appliances lying around” - P2 (Investigator). 
“And the door is wide open without locking the door and making sure that 
everything is safe” - P9 (SO). 
“… we are not taking our job seriously because we have to take our drop 
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serious” - P17 (Contractor). 
Another participant said that negligence was due to a lack of discipline: 
“… due to lack of discipline and motivation” - P1 (SO). 
“People do as they please” - P13 (SO). 
“… there is no discipline, for instance” - P4 (SO). 
It is clear from the participants that negligence by employees contributes to threats 
and vulnerabilities. 
(c) Lack of sufficient security personnel 
According to the participants, there are insufficient security officers to perform 
security functions in an effective and efficient manner. Some of the responses of the 
participants were: 
“… sometimes you find out that maybe you don't give them enough 
manpower to maintain the relevant posts where people are waiting” - P9 
(SO). 
“And the size and capabilities of security staff that we have on site” - P15 
(SO). 
“We are very few security officials to do security work” - P8 (Senior 
Inspector). 
“Looking at the number of people, how big the company is, with limited 
security officers is difficult” - P5 (SO). 
“… we have a shortage of manpower after peak hour” - P16 (Technology). 
“We cannot safeguard this, this kind of power station with four officers 
during the night or four officers during the day” - P11 (Intelligence). 
According to the participants, the number of security deployed is inadequate to 
perform security functions and that this contributes to the causes of security threats 
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and vulnerabilities.  
(d) Leakage and improper protection of information 
The participants maintained that improper protection of information contributed to 
security threats and vulnerabilities. Nkwana (2015:55) indicates that, should 
information be leaked by an employee, the impact will affect the objectives of 
organisation causing harm. Some of the participants indicated: 
“According to my understanding is the issue of not protecting information” 
- P11 (Intelligence). 
“Caused by some of our officers who can fail to protect the information on 
our station” - P1 (SO). 
“They are sharing information, sharing sensitive information with the 
people who are not in security department …” - P10 (SO). 
“Someone can take his USB and then enter the server room and then 
took the information from that who is on the server” - P18 (SO). 
It is clear that the leakage of information by employees was a serious concern for the 
participants as it can be used to the disadvantage of the employer.  
(e) Lack of budget on security measures 
The participants indicated that the management of Medupi does not allocate 
sufficient funds for the security measures. The major risk that contributes to 
ineffectiveness of security risk control measures was budgetary constraints 
(Nkwana, 2015:116). Some of the participants indicated that: 
“…station lack of money to fund security measures to prevent crime” - P4 
(SO). 
“…the problem is lack of budget” - P8 (Senior Inspector). 
“…they are not giving any money for security functions” - P7 (SO). 




It is clear from the participants that budget constrains contributes to the causes of 
security threats and vulnerabilities at Medupi Power Station. 
(f) Poor management and communication 
The participants indicated that poor management is characterised by a lack of 
effective communication with employees. In a study conducted by Pretorius 
(2012:170), findings indicated that top management should be responsible for 
security as some of the participants noted: 
“… that poor management in this station is a serious problem” - P18 (SO). 
“… poor communication can cost the station too much” - P3 (SO). 
“Communication is difficult especially to us. As security officers, we need 
that daily” - P10 (SO). 
“Knowing what to do on a daily basis; start strategising our daily duties” - 
P11 (Intelligence). 
“We are trying by all means to engage our supervisors and managers 
about the challenges that we're having here. But it takes a long time to 
come [back] to us” - P8 (Senior Inspector). 
It is clear from the participants that poor management is characterised by a lack of 
communication. This negatively impacts the performance of the security officers.  
(g) Improper search due to a lack of manpower 
The participants indicated that a lack of manpower restricted them from conducting 
thorough searches of people entering and leaving the premises. People are 
therefore able to go inside with dangerous objects and also to leave with property 
stolen from the employer without being searched. Some of the participants said: 
“We are not doing a thorough searching because of shortage of 
manpower” - P17 (Contractor). 
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“… shortage of manpower gives people opportunity to bring with them 
things [that] are not required” - P1 (SO). 
“Manpower problem has been a challenge for a long time” - P15 (SO). 
It is clear from the participants that an insufficient number of officers pose a serious 
challenge to the safety and security of people and assets at the Medupi Power 
Station. 
(h) Theft committed by contract workers 
According to the participants, contract workers are responsible for the number of 
threats and vulnerabilities within Medupi. Some of the participants noted: 
“They are involved in theft of laptops and other equipment used by the 
contractors” - P13 (SO). 
“… thief can come and over overpower those at the gate and get access” 
- P1 (SO). 
“… we've had complaints from subcontractors that people are stealing 
stuff” - P7 (SO). 
“Most of the people are contractors who are working with those cables or 
copper and they steal them” - P12 (SO). 
“… and contractors … are always found to be in possession of illegal 
firearms and ammunition” - P2 (Investigator). 
“And then, on the issue of nonferrous metals, such as copper cable, 
mostly is committed by contractors” - P5 (SO). 
“… when contractors engage in a protest, they end up committing 
property crimes such as a malicious injury to property” - P18 (SO). 
It is clear from the participants that contract workers were responsible for crimes in 
the Medupi Power Station.  
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4.3.1.6 What type of security measures is needed to reduce security 
threats and vulnerabilities? 
Theme 11: Types of security measures to reduce security threats and 
vulnerabilities at Medupi Power Station 
In this question, the participants were expected to explain the types of security 
measures to be installed to prevent threats and vulnerabilities effectively and 
efficiently. The following are some of the categories that emerged on this question: 
(a) The use of one gate for all personnel 
The participants agreed about the problems of the use of multiple gates and they 
suggested that the number of gates be reduced so that the movement of people and 
vehicles can be effectively controlled even though there was a shortage of 
manpower and resources. This theme is not supported by any evidence from the 
literature therefore it will add to the existing gap in the literature. Some of the 
participants said that: 
“… maybe the main thing is to use only one gate, then we can manage to 
search and do proper security work” - P3 (SO). 
“… they may decide to have one gate and then the crime will be 
combated” - P6 (Senior Manager). 
“Using one gate makes the job easier with high impact in combating 
crime” - P12 (SO). 
It is clear from the participants that many gates compromise the security of the 
assets and people. They suggested that the number of gates be reduced to a 
manageable size. 
(b) Deploy more manpower to ensure effective patrols 
The participants suggested that there was a need to recruit more officers to perform 




“… we don’t have enough manpower to deal with the challenges we are 
facing” - P18 (SO). 
“… if we can have the ones that can be broken by having enough 
manpower for conducting searching at the gates” - P16 (Technology). 
“… enough manpower to maintain the relevant posts where people are 
waiting” - P4 (SO). 
The participants believed that more manpower was needed to combat crime at the 
premises.  
(c) Patrol all areas three times a day and also during the night 
The participants also suggested that an ideal security measure would be to ensure 
that patrols are done at least three times during the day and at night because cable 
thieves operate mostly at night (Pretorius, 2012:54). This would increase the number 
of patrols they currently have. Some of the participants said: 
“… routine patrol must be taken at least three times a day and three times 
during the night that can help to minimise…” - P13 (SO). 
“I want to see vehicles patrolling” - P11 (Intelligence). 
 “I want to see people that are driving at high speed on a plant can 
discipline for them they see people that are driving unworthy vehicles on 
the … plant, also be disciplined” - P7 (SO). 
The participants indicated that patrols should be conducted three times during the 
day and at night to assist in reducing crime through security visibility. 
(d) Effective communication and two-way radio communication 
The participants desired effective communication, amongst themselves, employees 
and management. Some of the participants indicated that: 




“I think [it] is where we can talk to each other” - P12 (SO). 
“The more meetings we can have will reduce lot of uncertainties and 
increase the level of trust” - P6 (Senior Manager). 
The participants said that there was a need for effective communication between all 
the role-players in security that include security officers, management and 
employees within Medupi. In terms of radio communication, some of the participants 
said that: 
“… anytime or mostly anytime, but especially where you may find that 
there is an incident or an irregularity that we want to communicate about” - 
P13 (SO). 
“… and effective communication” - P4 (SO). 
“… so we need effective methods and effective communication if there are 
emergencies to understand; so that they spend must be less than 10 
minutes to the site. So, but so that it can stop people from damaging the 
property” - P9 (SO). 
“… use the two-way radio is an essential means for communication” - P11 
(Intelligence). 
It is clear from the participants that communication is the key to productivity. They 
believed that, where there is effective communication, there are fewer uncertainties 
and an open-door policy. 
(e) CCTV surveillance cameras 
According to the participants, there was a need for the installation of CCTV 
surveillance cameras around the premises. According to Moyo (2019:5), CCTV 
cameras are used as solution to security problems in crime prevention and control. 
CCTV cameras also play a role during evidence gathering (Visser, 2015:44). The 
participants viewed CCTV as an effective tool to enhance the protection of assets 
and people. Some of the participants indicated that: 
“… CCTV cameras can be installed in all the places and be monitored by 
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two officers” - P3 (SO). 
“… for having CCTV camera in the control room, and that control room 
supposed to be operational …” - P9 (SO). 
“The cameras must always be on and then it must be someone on the 
camera room that is looking around the side 24/7” - P10 (SO). 
“… then monitor the CCTV so that people must not for anything out of 
fence” - P17 (Contractor). 
“CCTV cameras are in place in and around Medupi to assist in in physical 
security” - P18 (SO). 
“… we need to have camera systems around the perimeter fence” -  P11 
(Intelligence). 
The participants indicated that having CCTV cameras around Medupi would impact 
positively on combating crime.  
(f) Provision of sufficient manpower and resources 
The participants believed that there was a need for more manpower and resources 
to enable the effective functioning of security officers. Some of the participants 
indicated that: 
“… my manager for applying to heavy enough resources we are using … 
for conducting proper duties” - P12 (SO). 
“… not working without full manpower” - P15 (SO). 
“… must maintain more manpower because it's the national. This power 
station is maintained by the country so it needs more protection than 
anything” - P2 (Investigator). 
“… having enough security officers perform their duties without fear …” - 
P8 (Senior Inspector). 
According to the participants, there was a need for more personnel in the security 
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department to be able to perform security functions.  
(g) The use of law enforcement and external private security investigators 
The participants’ responses indicated that, once a crime has occurred, there is a 
need for the use of the police and investigators from the private security industry. It is 
important that investigators from both the police and security industry get involved in 
the collection and analysis of information about crimes (Lutchminarain, 2015:54). 
This is an integrated approach to solving crime in the premises. Shuping (2018:1) 
asserts that, in November 2016, the security officers and private investigators 
contracted by ESKOM were combined to arrest the accused after they were found 
cutting copper cable. Some of the participants felt that: 
“… so that they can call the police to come in take arrest that person …” - 
P1 (SO). 
“I want to see arrests being made” - P11 (Intelligence). 
“We must work together with both the police and security investigators” - 
P16 (Technology). 
According to the participants, there was a need for an integrated approach with other 
law enforcement agencies to assist security officers when crime has taken place. 
(h) The need for the technology to detect people far from the fence 
The participants suggested that there was a need for technology to detect 
trespassers around the perimeter fence. This theme is not supported by literature as 
it only relies on the evidence from the findings. Some of the participants said: 
“… in this station, we need … advanced technology that can detect … any 
… trades, a hundred, 1200 kilometres away from the power station” - P4 
(SO). 
“Though we not know what technology can be used, something needs to 
be thoughtful for” - P6 (Senior Manager). 
“Such technology must detect the potential intruder’s movement before 
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they enter, so that we can be alerted and prevent them from committing 
crime” - P18 (SO). 
The participants suggested that, in order to deter the intruders from entering, there is 
a need for a specific technology that can be used to deter criminals from entering the 
premises. 
(i) Identification mark for all the tools used 
The participants suggested that all the tools that are used should be marked so that 
they are identifiable. Some of the participants indicated that: 
“… most tools, when I'm talking specifically for the tool has been mapped, 
the assets like laptop printer should have been checked, put the checker 
on it” - P12 (SO). 
“Tools, such as the grinder, should be marked, so that, once is lost, we 
can check for the mark” - P13 (SO). 
“… for the tools, we can look on a certain mark for a certain company, so 
that we can get all those tools and detain the criminals” - P11 
(Intelligence). 
According to the participants, all the tools used in the premises should be provided 
with identification in case a tool is lost or is in possession of a certain person who 
should be identifiable. 
Theme 12: Description of the participant’s role in the proposed security 
measures mentioned above 
The participants indicated that their role in security measures is to ensure that there 
is sufficient manpower daily. Some of the participants said that: 
“… making sure that we have enough manpower on a daily basis …” - P7 
(SO). 
“… and every night, I think it's, we can do lot by ensuring that security 
functions are performed adequately” - P1 (SO). 
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“We cannot safeguard power station with four officers during the night or 
four officers during the day” - P15 (SO). 
According to the participants, they played a key role in ensuring that everything is in 
order at all times.  
(a) Effective communication 
The participants believed that effective communication with security officers is 
important: 
“… effective communication, if there are emergencies to understand, so 
that they spend must be less than 10 minutes to the site …” - P5 (SO). 
“Security job needs officers to communicate effectively” - P9 (SO). 
“We must ensure that we communicate more and more” - P18 (SO). 
According to the participants, communication plays a fundamental role in the security 
environment.  
(b) Good relationship with security officers 
According to the participants, there was a need for the managers to have good 
relationships with the security officers. Some of the participants said that: 
“… inform and encourage employees …” - P10 (SO). 
“… o have a good and close relationship” - P4 (SO). 
“… we need to have a very good relationship that we communicate on a 
regular basis and show each other …” - P17 (Contractor). 
According to the participants, a good relationship with security officers is important 
because, when they are motivated, they to perform their duties well. 
(c) Motivate the security officers 
According to the participants, there was a need to motivate the security officers to 
perform their duties as motivation can increase employee performance (Singh et al, 
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2016:107). Some of the participants indicated that: 
“… you must motivate your guys when you work with so that they can 
have energy on whatever they are doing …” - P3 (SO). 
“… motivate your staff, so that they must not feel or they are not welcome 
on your site; they must feel happy when they wake up every day go into it, 
they must know we are going to do our job” - P7 SO).   
“Motivate them to do the work” - P10 (SO). 
According to the participants, motivation was important in boosting the moral of the 
security officers so that they were able to conduct their duties with the necessary 
energy. Participants said that: 
“Say thank you very much what a good job done, well done” (P6). 
“You've got to be humane as well and we've got to treat our security as 
humans” - P11 (Intelligence). 
“… we cannot treat them like having to say when you employ monkeys, I 
mean, you employ monkeys, you're gonna pay peanuts to do the job” - 
P16 (Technology). 
4.4 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to discuss and interpret the findings of responses 
received from participants during the interview sessions. In terms of the demographic 
make-up of the participants, most of them were married and aged between 38 and 
42 with certificates as their qualifications. During the data analysis phase, the 
researcher identified twelve themes and several categories arising out of the data 
analysis process.  
In summary, criminal activities at Medupi Power Station emerged as a significant 
theme, in particular, crimes such as theft of copper cable and theft of working tools 
emerged as categories from the participants during analysis of the data.  
In another theme, participants described the different modus operandi of crimes 
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committed at Medupi and categories, such as smuggling of stolen goods, were 
identified. Almost all the participants indicated that employees cut copper cables into 
pieces and rolled them to fit in either a bag or a two litre Coke bottle to smuggle them 
out of the power station. 
Identification of security threats and vulnerabilities was another theme identified in 
the study. The participants believed that security threats and vulnerabilities at 
Medupi are high even though a number of security measures exist at Medupi such 
as boom-gates, security officers, CCTV surveillance cameras, turnstiles, access 
cards, electric fences, biometrics and metal detectors. Under the theme of the 
security officers’ roles in combating crime, the following categories were identified: 
conduct regular patrols and attend to incidents, strengthen access control measures, 
enforce compliance with site rules and their inability to deal with armed suspects. 
Participants’ experience of combating crime was another important theme identified 
in the study. Some of the categories recognised were, inter alia, ensuring that all 
equipment and personnel are protected on site, sharing information with the police, 
more foot and vehicle patrols and encouraging team-work among members. 
Methods or strategies to combat crime was another theme and the following 
categories were identified for this theme: encouraging healthy work relationships, 
encouraging the reporting of suspicious activities, monitoring movements and details 
of people and vehicles on site, using personnel identification cards, CCTV cameras 
and patrols. 
Under the theme of resources needed to combat crime, categories, such as CCTV 
surveillance cameras, security alarm systems, locking systems for doors and 
windows, two-way radio communication, flashlight torches and digital cameras were 
some of the categories identified in the study. In another theme, the challenges 
experienced when combating crime, the participants indicated that they experienced 
many challenges when combating crime including employee negligence, leaving 
valuable items such as laptops unattended and warehouses and offices open. The 
type of security measures to reduce security threats and vulnerabilities at Medupi 
Power Station was another theme identified in the study. 
The study also indicated that criminals are using different modus operandi to steal 
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copper cables and commit a variety of other crimes at Medupi Power Station. 
Therefore, reducing the threats and vulnerabilities will impact positively not only on 






SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the conclusions and recommendations of 
the study as guided by the findings of the study. The aim of this study was to 
evaluate security threats and vulnerabilities confronting the Medupi Power Station in 
the Limpopo Province as a Critical Infrastructure, in order to improve existing 
security measures at the power plant. The research approach for this study was 
explorative in nature. The researcher employed a qualitative research design for this 
study because the topic under study was not exhaustively researched and there is 
limited information on security threats and vulnerabilities confronting the Medupi 
Power Station as a Critical Infrastructure. 
For this study, the researcher used purposive sampling to select the sample as only 
participants who had knowledge and experience of security threats at Medupi Power 
Station were included. Eighteen (18) participants who were purposively selected 
agreed to participate and they included senior managers, security officers, 
investigator, intelligence, technology, senior inspectors, and contractors. 
5.2 Summary of findings 
The participants’ responses indicated that copper cable theft and theft of working 
equipment’s are on the increase in the Medupi Power Station. It was revealed that 
the modus operandi used to commit copper cable theft is to cut cables into pieces 
and put them in bags, place them in two litre Coke bottles and even lunch boxes. 
This is a new finding that will to add to the existing gap in the literature. The stolen 
cables are smuggled by hiding them inside the bonnet of their vehicles. This is also a 
new modus operandi which is not supported by the literature. Some smuggle it under 
the seat of a bus or wrap stolen cables around their body parts, such as on the legs 
covered by trousers and on the body covered by clothes. This type of modus 
operandi lacks support from the literature which renders it to be a new theme as 
emerged from the findings. In addition, copper cables are also stolen inside and 
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thrown over the fence for later collection, either at night or to be collected by their 
accomplices. Criminals also cut fences to get access to premises to commit other 
crimes. 
The findings also revealed that in order to reduce crime on site, security officers 
perform searches of vehicles and persons, and also carry out foot and vehicle 
patrols. The responses showed that security officers use CCTV surveillance 
cameras and access control measures to reduce crime. The study found that the 
security threats and vulnerabilities that occur at Medupi are caused by the use of 
more than one gate due to a lack of resources, employee negligence and sharing of 
computer passwords. 
The participants revealed that some of the security measures that are available at 
Medupi are: boom gates, security officers, CCTV surveillance cameras to monitor 
the movement of people entering and leaving the premises, turnstiles to control 
access at the gate, access cards to ensure that only authorised people enter the 
premises, electric fences and biometric systems to prevent unauthorised access, 
and metal detectors to search people when they enter and leave the premises.  
The power station security officers combat criminal activities by conducting regular 
patrols and attending the scenes of incidents in the premises and by strengthening 
security measures by controlling access. It was also established that security officers 
may collaborate with criminals to steal from the employer. In order to combat criminal 
activities, security officers need to enforce the law in combination with the site rules. 
It was also revealed that, although security officers play a role, they have challenges 
when faced with criminals who are armed. 
The findings also indicate that the role of security manager in combating crime is to 
ensure that all equipment and personnel are protected on site at all times. It was also 
revealed that the security officers need to share crime related information with the 
police. Activities that are conducted in order to combat crime include conducting foot 
and vehicle patrols, tool verification at the access control point, encouraging the 
security officers to perform security functions diligently and ensuring that alarms are 
always functional. The participants said that they conducted searches of people and 
vehicles that enter and leave the premises. They are also responsible for locking the 
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doors, enhancing compliance with policies, procedures and directives, and educating 
visitors and employees on access control procedures.  
The participants indicated that methods or strategies that they use to combat crime 
are to encourage healthy work relationships among security officers and also to 
encourage employees to report any suspicious activities. The participants indicated 
that they also monitor the movements of people and keep records of people and 
vehicles entering the site. The use of CCTV surveillance cameras was also 
established during the interviews with the participants. The findings also indicated 
that they conduct patrols, use metal detectors and personal identification cards at 
access control points. In order to combat crime effectively and efficiently, the 
responses indicated that they need security alarm systems, door locking systems, 
flashlight torches, two-way radio communication, pocket books, night vision 
cameras, firearms and bullet proof vests.  
The findings revealed that the causes of security threats and vulnerabilities at the 
power station were: unauthorised employee absenteeism, employee negligence, a 
lack of sufficient security personnel, leakage and improper protection of information, 
a lack of budget for security measures, poor management and a lack of 
communication, a shortage of searches due to a lack of manpower, and theft 
committed by contract workers.  
5.3 Conclusion 
In this study, it was found that the ideal security measures to reduce threats and 
vulnerabilities are: the use of one gate for all personnel, deployment of more 
manpower to ensure effective patrols, patrolling of all areas three times a day and 
also during the night, effective communication and two-way radio communication, 
CCTV surveillance cameras, provision of sufficient manpower and the necessary 
resources, the use of law enforcement and external private security investigators, the 
need for the technology that has the capability to detect people far from the fence 
and identification marks for all the tools used on site.  
The management of Critical Infrastructure should be responsible for the prevention 
of crime and ensure that security officers are thoroughly vetted before they are 
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employed. Vetting will ensure that people chosen have good credentials; they will be 
security officers who are committed to doing their duties and will perform security 
functions within the law. Tightening security measures needs to be supplemented by 
security policy and procedures. The management of the power station should ensure 
that contractors ensure that their employees are paid at the date and time that they 
have agreed upon as this will have positive effect on addressing the theft of working 
tools. Finally, the study found that the role of security supervisor or manager in the 
proposed security measures is to ensure effective communication, good 
relationships amongst security officers and ensure continuous motivation of security 
officers. 
5.4 Recommendations 
The recommendations of this study emanated from the research findings that 
Medupi Power Station, as a Critical Infrastructure, is vulnerable to security threats. 
The findings of this research revealed that there is a gap in the literature on security 
threats and vulnerabilities of Critical Infrastructures in South Africa. Based on this, 
the researcher proposes the following recommendations:  
 The prevention of copper cable theft, theft of computers and theft of 
working tools 
The findings revealed that the major criminal activity taking place at Medupi Power 
Station is copper cable theft, theft of computers and theft of working tools. Copper 
cable theft does not only affect the employer, but also the whole of society that 
expects uninterrupted services from the power station. It is recommended that the 
power station should ensure that sufficient budget is allocated to security functions. 
In addition, an intensive security risk survey be conducted in order to determine the 
type of security measures are required to address specific type of threats and 
vulnerabilities such as the theft of copper cables. This will help to address criminal 
activities due to the gap in security measures. 
 Top management and security managers to play a role in preventing 
threats and vulnerabilities 
The problem of theft and other forms of crime can be reduced if management has 
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buy-in into security functions. The head of the security department should have the 
relevant qualifications in security and ensure that education, training and awareness 
of crime on site are conducted.  
 Education, training, security awareness and security culture 
The security department should be responsible for creating a security culture. All 
employees, not only security officers, should be part of the overall security. Training 
on security related issues can be provided by a private security provider. 
 Conducting a comprehensive security survey 
A comprehensive security survey should be conducted by an independent security 
consultant.  
 Budget allocation for security measures 
It is recommended that the management should assign sufficient budget for security 
functions in order to achieve return on investment.  
 Provision of sufficient manpower 
The participants outlined manpower as a serious challenge to reduce threats and 
vulnerabilities. It is recommended that security survey should be conducted in order 
to determine the number of security officers required. It is suggested that the 
recommendations of the survey be implemented with caution and that budget should 
be allocated to address the recommendations in the survey report. 
 Provision of the necessary security measures 
The findings revealed that there are insufficient security measures and that some of 
them are there but are not being monitored, for example, CCTV cameras. It is 
recommended that a company be contracted to be responsible for the maintenance 
of the CCTV cameras. 
 Access control measures 
The responses indicated that access control measures are compromised due to a 
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lack of resources. It is recommended that budget should be set aside for the 
purchase of access control measures as per the recommendations of the security 
survey. 
 Identification marks for working tools 
It is recommended that each contract company be encouraged to mark their working 
tools. This will assist the security officers manning access control to know which 
tools belong to each company, and will also assist in knowing who took a specific 
tool so that the relevant people are held to account. 
 Perimeter fence 
It is recommended that the perimeter fence be high enough to deter criminals and 
that concrete is poured underneath it to prevent criminals from digging under the 
fence. 
 Use of more than one entrance and exit gate 
It is recommended that, due to a lack of manpower, only one gate be used for 
efficient access control to ensure that only authorised people gain access. 
 Employees’ attitudes towards crime and security measures 
It is recommended that awareness and training be conducted to change the attitudes 
of employees so that they will understand the impact of crime on the power station.  
 Information security 
It is important to encourage users of computers about the impact of sharing their 
passwords to access information about the power station. Employees should be 
encouraged to report any misuse or unauthorised use of passwords. 
 Effective security policy and procedures 
It is recommended that security policy and procedures be aligned with the findings of 
the security survey and clearly state the security functions (Fay & Patterson, 2018). 
This will assist in ensuring that any security breach is contained in the policy and 
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those that breach be held accountable. 
 Enhance communication 
Poor communication between security management and security officials is a barrier 
to effective security. Therefore, it is recommended that the management enhance 
communication channels to ensure that employees are provided with the necessary 
information they require to do their jobs. 
 Information leakage 
To discourage the leakage of information, it is recommended that security officers 
are vetted and/or sign a confidentiality contract while awaiting the outcome of the 
vetting process.  
 Integrated approach in reducing threats and vulnerabilities 
It is recommended that, in order to reduce threats and vulnerabilities, there is a need 
for integrated approach which involves the security supervisor, security investigators, 
and police.  
 Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) 
Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) needs to be applied to 
protect entities such as Critical Infrastructure. CPTED can be used as a tool to 
discourage crime at Medupi. It is an environmental approach to prevent crime which 
focuses on reducing crime opportunities by manipulating the physical and social 
quality of an environment (Shariati, 2017:1). Lee, Park and Jung (2016:5) state that 
CPTED decreases the fear of crime by enhancing CPTED principles such as access 
control, natural surveillance, territoriality, activity support and maintenance. 
5.5 Suggestions for future research 
There is a need for future research to evaluate the effectiveness of security 
measures especially at National Key Points, such as Medupi, that are still under 
construction. Future research should also evaluate the impact of the contractors 
working within the NKP on crime. The relationship between contract security and in-
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house security on the occurrence of crime on site needs to be part of a service level 
agreement. To stimulate further research, it is recommended that a thorough security 
survey analysis be conducted prior to the employment of contractors. A security 
survey will guide the management on security budget allocation in order to effectively 
and efficiently prevent crime in the NKP.  
It is recommended that future research should focus on management’s attitude to 
security measures since the findings established that security threats and 
vulnerabilities occur at Medupi as a result of poor management. Research could 
focus on addressing top management and management responsible for the role and 
function that security can play to ensure that sufficient budget is allocated to the 
security functions. Potential research should include case studies conducted on 
other Critical Infrastructure entities in South Africa to provide useful markers to assist 
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SCHOOL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINOLOGY AND SECURITY SCIENCE 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
___________________________________________________________________ 
TOPIC: AN EVALUATION OF SECURITY THREATS AND VULNERABILITIES AT 
A NATIONAL KEY POINT (CASE STUDY OF MEDUPI POWER STATION). 
 
Dear Mr/Ms …….. 
My name is Elias Motha Thoka, I am an MTech student at University of South Africa 
(UNISA) and I am conducting a study on “An Evaluation of security threats and 
vulnerabilities at the Medupi Power Station”. For this reason, I would like to ask 
you some questions relating to the topic. Participation in this study is voluntary and 
the information you provide is private, confidential and anonymity.  
The information will only be used for the purpose of the study and none of the 
information will be shared with a third party. This research is not funded by any 
organization. You may withdraw from the interview at any time of the interview 
without any consequences. This interview will take +-45 minutes. A tape recorder will 
be used to assist the researcher in transcribing the interview at a later stage. If you 
have any questions about the research, please feel free to contact Elias Motha 
Thoka@ 078 709 3603, and ThokaME@eskom.co.za. 
1. SECTION A (Demographic details) 
 
The following questions are for statistical purposes only. 
  
1.1 Gender: 
Male 1   
123 
 




18-22   years 1   
23-27   years 2   
28-32   years 3   
33-37   years 4   
37-42  years 5   
48-52 year 6   
53+ 7   
1.2 Marital status: 
  
Single 1   
Married 2   
Unknown 3   
Divorced 4   
Widowed 5   
  
1.3 Educational qualification: 
Degree 1   
Advanced  diploma 2   
Diploma(3  years) 3   
Certificate 4   
Standard 
10/Grade  12 
5   






1. What types of crimes occurs at Medupi power station? What, Who, 
When, Why, 
Where and How? 
 How would you describe criminal activities that are taking 
place? 
 How would you describe modus operandi of crime? 
 Describe how you manage to reduce crimes on-site? 




Where and How? 
 How would you describe how to identify threats on-site? 
 How would you describe how to reduce threats and 
vulnerabilities around Medupi? 
 How would you describe your security measures around 
Medupi? 
3. How can power station security officers combat criminal 
activities at Medupi? 
What, Who, 
When, Why, 
Where and How?  How would you describe your experiences of combating 
crime? 
 What is your role in combating crime? 
 Are there any methods or strategies that you are using to 
combat crime? 
 What resources are you using to combat crime? 
 What are the challenges experienced when combating 
crime? 
 What are the best practices of combating crime? 
4. What are the causes of the security threats and 
vulnerabilities to power station?  
What, Who, 
When, Why, 
Where and How? 
 How would you describe the causes of security threats and 
vulnerabilities to power station? 
 What is your understanding of those causes? 
5. What type of security measures is needed to reduce 
security threats and vulnerabilities? 
What, Who, 
When, Why, 
Where and How? 
 In your opinion, describe an ideal of security measures that 
you see fit in this station? 
  How would you describe your role in your proposed security 
measures mentioned above? 






Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. Your input will be very valuable to 
my study Medupi to improve the role of security measures at Medupi Power Station. 
It will assist me to make recommendations to management to improve security 
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